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THE RULE OF LIBERTY 
Chris Kozak 
ABSTRACT 
Conservative judges are frequently portrayed as enemies of 
civil rights. These judges typically respond to criticism by protesting 
that they are not prejudiced; they are only eschewing harmful 
“results-based” reasoning. “Law” they say, “is useless . . . if it 
varies from day to day and from judge to judge.”1 The law is never 
fully determinate, so these judges counsel us to look to our traditions 
to find values, not abstract notions of justice. The appeal of this 
method is undeniable. It anchors us in our collective will and adopts 
only those values which have survived the crucible of experience.  
These values also have a distinct rightward tilt. And so, we are 
accused of being at least as wishy-washy as liberal thinkers. In this 
Article, I demonstrate that not all traditional interpretive values are 
right-leaning. For most of our history, the maxim behind the Rule of 
Lenity applied in another context: slavery and freedom. Based in the 
presumption that the natural law favored personal liberty, it 
required courts to interpret emancipations liberally. The canon—
which I call the Rule of Liberty—was unquestioned in the United 
States until the South began to fear abolition. In the 1850s, the South 
inverted the canon, presuming instead that the natural law favored 
slavery. This was a foundational principle of Dred Scott. After 
abolition, reactionary lawyers induced the U.S. Supreme Court to 
silently retain this presumption, and its ghost is still with us today.  
The Rule of Liberty’s pedigree rivals even the most ancient 
rules of construction, and it was approved by every state of our 
Union. Its demise was not due to structural flaws; it was destroyed 
by Klansmen and Confederates intent on preserving slavery. Thus, 
there is no reason for conservatives to reject it. Indeed, we should 
return it to its rightful place as part of our constitutional tradition.   
  
                                                 
1. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Subjective Art; Objective Law, 85 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1663, 1684 (2010).  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Rule of Lenity is a staple in Supreme Court jurisprudence.2 
It is an old principle, derived from the Roman maxim in favorem 
vitae et libertatis (in favor of life and liberty).3 However, the Romans 
                                                 
 2. See generally Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998); 
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 538 (2010); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW § 47 (2012).  
 3. See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961); United 
States v. Fah Chung, 132 F. 109, 112 (S.D. Ga. 1904); JEAN ALLAIN, THE LEGAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY 21, 37-39; Intisar A. Rabb, The Islamic Rule of 
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first used the axiom, not in criminal cases, but in the law of slavery. 
In cases of ambiguity, this Rule—The Rule of Liberty—required 
Roman judges to restrict slavery and favor human freedom.4 English 
and American judges alike adopted this thinking as a bedrock 
principle of the Common Law.5 At its most abstract, the Anglo-
American rule held that courts must presume in favor of liberty,6 and 
that all instruments conferring freedom must be construed liberally, 
in favor of freedom.7 
Surprisingly, the courts in most slave states proclaimed that this 
rule was “unquestioned.”8 But as the South began to fear abolition, 
its courts abruptly changed course and decided that the law ought to 
favor slavery.9 These decisions were the unseen foundation of Dred 
Scott v. Sandford.10 Following abolition, reactionary Southern 
lawyers convinced the U.S. Supreme Court to silently retain the 
assumptions of these decisions—including Dred Scott—to impose a 
restrictive gloss on the Thirteenth Amendment.11 Since then, the Rule 
of Liberty has drifted into obsolescence. 
Then again, so has slavery. But the Rule of Liberty has a role in 
our modern legal system, for at least three reasons. First, it is 
necessary if Dred Scott is, as most people assume, fully overruled. 
Second, it is necessary to ward against artificial restrictions like 
those that the South imposed on the Thirteenth Amendment—
restrictions that enabled the rise of Jim Crow. The Warren Court 
                                                                                                       
Lenity: Judicial Discretion and Legal Canons, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 
1299, 1309 n.33 (2011). AARON X. FELLMETH & MAURICE HOROWITZ, A GUIDE TO 
LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (2009). 
 4. ALLAIN, supra note 3, at 37-39.  
 5. THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY 
RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 80 (Alexander Tsesis, ed., 2010); 
William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North America, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1715-16, 1724 (1996). 
 6. III WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
88-89 n.30 (1753). 
 7. See Isaac v. West, 6 Randolph 652, 652-57 (Va. 1828) (citing 
JUSTINIAN, DIGEST and LORD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 124b); Elder v. Elder, 4 Leigh 252, 260 (Va. 1833). 
 8. E.g., Harry v. Decker & Hopkins, 1 Walk. Miss. 36, 42 (Miss. 1818) 
(“Slavery is condemned by reason and the laws of nature. It exists and can only 
exist, through municipal regulations, and in matters of doubt, is it not an 
unquestioned rule that courts must lean in favorem vitae et libertatis?”).  
 9. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 81-82. 
 10. JUSTIN BUCKLEY DYER, NATURAL LAW AND THE ANTISLAVERY 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 100-01 (2012); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393 (1856).  
 11. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  
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chafed at the injustices created by this system. But in its haste to end 
a century of quasi-slavery, the Court upended separation of powers, 
federalism, and textualism all at once—invoking amorphous 
concepts of “freedom.” The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have 
rightfully pushed back against the judicial abuse these methods 
permit. But if the Warren Court taught us anything, it showed that 
overcorrection is dangerous. The Rule of Liberty presents a 
principled way to protect civil rights without wading into the morass 
of subjectivity or overcompensating for past mistakes. The rule 
allows courts, as one Kentucky judge put it in 1820, to decide cases 
using “the law as it is, and not as it ought to be.”12 
Finally, it provides an opportunity for conservative thinkers to 
prove that they are loyal to principles, not politics. The Roberts 
Court’s substantive canons have a distinct rightward tilt. The stated 
justification for these interpretive values is that they are based in our 
history and tradition, and not conjured by the political preferences of 
the Justices.13 I do not doubt the truth of this statement. But the only 
judges in our history who completely rejected the Rule of Liberty 
were Klansmen and Confederate sympathizers, and they did so out of 
a conviction that slavery was a natural right, ordained by God for the 
benefit of the white race.14 These values have been forcefully 
repudiated by the blood of our patriots15 and by our Constitution,16 
leaving only the unbroken presence of the Rule of Liberty in our 
common law. Thus—if history and tradition are the benchmark—
                                                 
12. Rankin v. Lydia, 2 A.K. Marsh. 467, 270-79 (Ky. 1820). 
13. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-9 (2001); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626-2627 
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 
LAW § 47 (2012). 
14. Am. Colonization Soc’y v. Gartrell, 23 Ga. 448, 464-65 (1857) 
(proclaiming that those fighting for abolition were “fighting against the Almighty.”); 
Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 578-83 (1851) (asserting that the right to hold slaves was 
a Right, and that “Christ, recognizing the relation of master and servant, ordained 
[slavery] as an institution of Christianity. It is the crowning glory of this age and of 
this land.”). 
15. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (“Four 
score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, 
conceived in Liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. 
Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation, 
so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. . . . [W]e here highly resolve that 
these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new 
birth of freedom . . .”), http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/ 
gettysburg.htm 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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there is no reason for conservative judges and thinkers to reject the 
Rule of Liberty. Indeed, there is every reason for us to embrace it. 
Part I discusses the origin of the Rule of Liberty. Part II then 
traces the life and death of the Rule in the United States. Part III 
argues that the Court ought to resurrect the Rule and apply it in 
Thirteenth Amendment cases. Finally, Part IV suggests some cases 
where the it could be useful.  
I. THE BIRTH OF THE RULE OF LIBERTY 
It was one of the laws of the twelve tables of Rome, that whenever there 
was a question between liberty and slavery, the presumption should be on 
the side of liberty.  
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England.17 
The Rule of Liberty was born in Rome. Although the Romans 
tolerated slavery, they viewed it as an “institution of the law of all 
nations under which one is subject to the mastership of another, 
contrary to nature.”18 Slaves were generally taken as captives in 
war,19 but many Roman jurists felt that it violated natural law, 
declaring that “we compare slavery almost with death.”20 These 
judges apparently devised the Rule of Liberty to keep slavery in 
check.21 In general, the rule was that when the law was ambiguous, it 
must be interpreted to restrict slavery and favor freedom.22 
The canon did not fade after the fall of Rome. It was “so well-
established in the Middle Ages that an attorney arguing an actual 
case . . . could plausibly draw upon it in argument.”23 From there, it 
was absorbed into Great Britain, where the rule that all presumptions 
cut in favor of liberty was “for centuries, a glory of English law.”24 
This principle caused the English Common Law to hold a special 
                                                 
 17. III BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 88-89 n.30. 
 18. Servitus, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW (1953) (emphasis 
added). 
 19. ALLAIN 12-13. 
 20. Servitus, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW (1953). 
 21. ALLAIN 9-16, 21 (quoting Dominicus Tuschus, Practicarum 
conclusionum juris, Lit. S, concl. 227, no. 1 (Rome 1651) (“Just as it is lawful to 
take any means to evade death, so also it is lawful to avoid slavery.”)); Servitus, 
ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW (1953);  
 22. ALLAIN 9-10, 37-39; JUSTINIAN, DIGEST, Lib. 50, tit. 17, § 179, Ulpian 
(in obscura voluntae manumittentis, favendum est lebertati (when will is in doubt, 
favor freedom)). 
 23. Wiecek, supra note 5, at 1715-16.  
 24. Id.  
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animus against slavery.25 For the English judge, property could not 
lie in a human being, because all men were by nature free.26 
“England,” they said, “was too pure an Air for Slaves to breath[e].”27 
This distaste for servitude also drove the abolition of feudalism 
in England.28 Blackstone pointed out that any time a Lord contracted 
with or sued his villeins, “the law, which is always ready to catch at 
anything in favor of liberty, presumed that by [this conduct] he 
meant to set his villein on the same footage as himself.”29 As one 
prominent English judge declared, “Servitude was introduced by 
men for vicious purposes. But freedom was instilled in human nature 
by God . . . The laws of England favor liberty in every case.”30 
The English Rule of Liberty was thus composed of two 
principles. First, it recognized that, under the natural and common 
law, all men were born free.31 Second, since the English positive law 
did not tolerate property rights in a human being,32 those property 
rights would not be enforced in England. In other words, when the 
positive law was indeterminate on someone’s freedom, the common 
law refused to assist those seeking to hold a person in slavery.33 
Lord Mansfield explained this principle in more detail in 
Somerset v. Stewart.34 Holding someone in slavery was, he said:  
So high an act of dominion [that it] must be recognized by the law of the 
country where it is used. . . . The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it 
is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but 
only on positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, 
occasion, and time itself from whence it was created is erased from 
memory: it [is] so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but 
positive law.35 
                                                 
 25. COKE, supra note 7, at 124b.   
 26. Wiecek, supra note 23, at 1715. 
 27. Id. at 1715, 1724.  
 28. PAUL FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF SLAVERY & BONDAGE 252.  
 29. IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
94-95 (1753); Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 511, 512 (1795) (Opinion of Heath, J.).  
 30. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGILÆ 105 (S.B. Chrimes 
trans. 1942) (1545).  
 31. Wiecek, supra note 23, at 1715. 
 32. Id. at 1715, 1724. 
 33. Somerset v. Stewart, 1 Lofft 1, 19 (1772).  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. 
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Therefore, the moment a slave set foot in England, he was 
free.36 After the slave trade was abolished, the courts applied 
Somerset to hold that claims for the “restoration of human beings” 
should be decided in favor of liberty unless it could be unequivocally 
shown that the slaves were held under the law of another country.37 
Somerset was never overruled, but it was limited by comity to only 
suspend the slave power while the slave was in England.38 If the 
slave was forced back to the slaveholding country, she would be free, 
but if she returned voluntarily, slavery would reattach.39  
This framework can also be described in terms of political 
power. The courts are not political actors, and these courts were not 
exercising political power. Instead, the courts merely demanded that 
a litigant show some political authority for exercising dominion over 
the labor of another. In other words, he must show some express, 
democratic authorization for his conduct. 
Somerset illustrates the ameliorative qualities of the Rule of 
Liberty. Like its cousin in criminal cases, it denied judicial 
enforcement unless the positive law was clear.40 But although Lenity 
only acts as a shield, Liberty was frequently used as a sword: 
extending the law in favor of freedom when there were glitches in 
the positive law. The first of these cases are from feudal England, 
where the judges emancipated people when their Lord took legal 
action against them.41 Other cases involved masters who contracted 
for freedom, but then defended the slave’s suit for specific 
performance by arguing that a slave could not contract.42 The courts 
rebuffed these arguments, reasoning that the nature of a contract for 
freedom warranted an extension of normal legal rules.43  
                                                 
 36. Id.; See also FINKELMAN, supra note 28, at 32-34. The admiralty courts 
extended this rule to cases where British warships boarded slave-trade vessels. See 
Forbes v. Cochrane, 2 B. & C. 448, 464-70, 473 (1824). 
 37. DYER, supra note 10, at 56-60. The admiralty courts later imposed the 
same standard on slavers caught by British warships. The Amedie, 1 Acton 240, 250-
51 (1810); DYER, supra note 10, at 56-59. Admiralty courts uniformly followed The 
Amedie’s holding. The Anne, 2 Acton 6, 7 (1810); The Fortuna, 1 Dodson 18 
(1811); Le Louis, 2 Dodson 210 (1817); Madrazo v. Willes, 3 B. & Ald. 353 (1820). 
 38. The Slave Grace, 2 Hagg. Adm. 94 (1827).  
 39. Id.  
 40. See Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2272 n.10 (2014) 
(stating that Lenity applies when the court “must simply guess at what Congress 
intended.”).  
 41. IV BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 94-95 (1753); see also Keane v. 
Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 511, 512 (1795) (Opinion of Heath, J.). 
 42. Williams v. Brown, 3 Bos. & Pul. 69, 72, 74 (1802).  
 43. See id. 
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American slaveholders frequently complained that such 
suppletion was unlawful because it contradicted the Rule of Lenity. 
Suppletion, they said, was penal, because it deprived them of vested 
property rights.44 But Blackstone debunked this false contradiction 
long before American slaveholders were born. He observed that 
statutes against frauds were interpreted liberally, even though their 
consequences were penal.45 Although this appeared to contradict 
Lenity, he disagreed: “Where the statute acts upon the offender, and 
inflicts a penalty . . . it is then to be taken strictly; but when the 
statute acts upon the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent 
transaction, here it is to be construed liberally.”46 
Criminal statutes act upon the offender. Therefore, Blackstone 
explained, “whenever an ambiguity arises in a statute introducing a 
new penalty or punishment, the decision shall be on the side of lenity 
and mercy; or in favor of natural right and liberty”47 This is desirable 
because even when the courts err, “no further inconvenience can 
result than that the law remains as it was . . . And it is more 
consonant to principles of liberty that the judge should acquit whom 
the legislator intended to punish, than that he should punish whom 
the legislator intended to discharge with impunity.”48  
In short, Lenity requires clarity when the positive law intrudes 
upon the natural right to be free from imprisonment. It is inherently 
confined to amelioration. The Rule of Liberty also performed this 
function, because the law of slavery imposed numerous disabilities 
on the slave.49 When the law was ambiguous, the courts followed the 
same formula: Require clarity from the legislature before intruding 
on the natural right to personal freedom.50  
                                                 
 44. See Harry v. Decker & Hopkins, 1 Walk. Miss. 36 (Miss. 1818).  
 45. III BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 88-89. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 88-89 n.30. 
 48. Id.  
 49. See, e.g., Slave, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1857) (stating that 
a slave is “[a] man who is by law deprived of his liberty or life, and becomes the 
property of another.” A slave “has no political rights, and generally has no civil 
rights.  He can enter into no contract, unless specially authorized by law; what he 
acquires generally, belongs to his master.”). 
 50. See, e.g., DYER at 56-60; Blackbor v. Negro Phill, 7 Yerger 452, 453-66 
(Tenn. 1835) (holding that even if a master intended to evade restrictions on 
emancipation, “still that will not place them in the condition of slaves. If this State 
designed to make such acts nullities, then express enactments should be shown.”); 
Foster v. Fosters, 10 Grattan 485, 485-92 (Va. 1853); Parks v. Hewlett, 9 Leigh 511, 
522-23 (Va. 1838). 
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But the law of slavery involved more than disabilities. When a 
master, statute, or Constitution freed a slave, it “acted upon the 
offence”51 by striking out the slave status. This act inflicted no 
penalty, but merely freed a human being from oppression, just as a 
fraudulent-conveyance statute relieves creditors from the burden of 
fraud. Such acts “must be construed according to the spirit; for, in 
giving relief against fraud, or in the furtherance and extension of 
natural right and justice, the judge may safely go beyond even that 
which existed in the minds of those who framed the law.”52 
The English Common Law favored emancipation.53 Thus, 
suppletion in favor of freedom was not offensive to the common law. 
As I demonstrate below, the southern judges who objected to the 
suppletive Rule of Liberty assumed that slavery was a natural right. 
In their minds, emancipation was not “in the furtherance of natural 
right and justice,”54 because it trenched upon the supposed natural 
right to hold slaves.55 
Slavery has been abolished in the United States.56 Therefore, 
the suppletive Rule of Liberty would dominate contemporary 
jurisprudence. This may prove disquieting to conservative thinkers. 
But if originalism is honest, it must adhere equally to every 
legitimate aspect of our history. The Rule of Liberty was not devised 
by wild-eyed lefties trying to expand the power of the government. It 
is as old as our law itself, it was an integral part of the Common 
Law, and it is enshrined in the text and structure of our Constitution. 
II. THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE AMERICAN RULE OF LIBERTY 
Like most interpretation in early American law, there was no 
systematic doctrine for applying the Rule of Liberty.57 It was 
imported from England like much of early American law,58 and 
                                                 
 51. III BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 88-89. 
 52. Id. at 88-89 n.30. 
 53. Somerset v. Stewart, 1 Lofft 1, 19 (1772). 
 54. III BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 88-89 n.30. 
 55. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856); Cleland v. 
Waters, 16 Ga. 496, 508, 513-20 (1854) (expressing “a settled conviction that 
[slavery] was wisely ordained by a forecast high as heaven above man’s, for the 
good of both races.”). 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 57. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 137-38 (West 2012).  
 58. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 80.  
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judges treated it that way. It appeared as a presumption,59 a clear-
statement rule,60 a tiebreaker,61 and a constitutional maxim.62 But as 
the sectional crisis deepened and the northern states started agitating 
for abolition, the southern courts annihilated the canon to justify the 
continued existence of slavery.63  
A. The Nature of the Right to Freedom 
The right to sue for freedom was a personal, common-law 
right, and did not depend on a statute for its existence.64 It was 
usually styled as a tort action for “trespass, assault and battery, and 
false imprisonment.”65 In every state, a slave could bring an action 
for freedom, and on a showing of probable cause, the court would 
enjoin the master from selling the slave pending trial.66 In contrast, 
                                                 
 59. See, e.g., Nichols v. Bell, 1 Jones N.C. 32, 32-34 (1853) (“We know of 
no law or decision that authorizes [a presumption that mixed-race children were 
slaves]. If we had the power, we certainly have not the disposition to extend the 
principle further . . . [This would be] against the rule that presumptions are always in 
favor of liberty.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Findly v. Nancy, 3 T.B. Mon. 400, 400-02 (Ky. 1826) (“It 
may be a matter of some consideration . . . whether the chancellor ought, in any 
case, to grant a new trial at law, for the purpose of taking away a right to freedom . . 
. . The case which would warrant such interference ought to be strong and clear.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Isaac v. West, 6 Randolph 652, 652-57 (Va. 1828) (“If this 
construction is doubtful, some weight is due to the maxim that every deed is to be 
taken most strongly against the grantor, and to the spirit of the laws of all civilized 
nations which favors liberty.”).  
 62. See, e.g., Harry v. Decker & Hopkins, 1 Walk. Miss. 36, 42 (Miss. 
1818) (“[Assuming] it was a doubtful point, whether the constitution was to be 
considered prospective in its operation or not, the [masters] say, you take from us a 
vested right arising from municipal law. The [slaves] say you would deprive us of a 
natural right guaranteed by the ordinance and the constitution. How should the Court 
decide, if construction were to really determine it? I presume it would be in favour 
of liberty. . .”). 
 63. See, e.g., Jameson v. McCoy, 5 Heiskell 108, 118 (Tenn. 1871) (noting 
that Tennessee’s jurisprudence on slavery “was marked by great liberality until the 
year 1831, when the public mind began first to be agitated by discussions in the 
Northern States of abolishing slavery”). 
 64. Butler v. Duvall, 4 Fed. Cas. 898, 900 (D.C. App. 1829) (Opinion of 
Cranch, C.J.) (“The remedy by petition for freedom . . . existed long before, and was 
in daily use at the time of passing the [Maryland act relating to emancipation] . . . 
There is no statute which expressly gives to a person, held in slavery, a right to sue 
for his freedom.”). 
 65. Jason A. Gillmer, Suing for Freeedom: Interracial Sex, Slave Law, and 
Racial Identity in the Post-Revolutionary and Antebellum South, 82 N.C. L. REV. 
535, 567-68 (2004).  
 66. Id. 
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habeas corpus could not ordinarily be used to adjudicate freedom; 
instead, it was used by people who were being wrongfully held in 
slavery.67 The right to emancipate (or manumit) a slave was also a 
common-law right.68 
1. The Right to Give Freedom 
The power of the owner to give, and the capacity of the slave to receive, 
freedom, exist in nature, and therefore may be used in every case and 
every way, except those in which it is forbidden by law. 
Supreme Court of North Carolina, Thompson v. Newlin (1851)69 
Before states regulated how masters could emancipate their 
slaves, courts rejected arguments that the form of an emancipation 
was defective.70 Almost without exception, the courts reasoned that 
as manumission was a common-law right, and that it could be used 
in any way not actually prohibited.71 The Texas courts, for example, 
held that “the owner could free his slave, provided no statute 
prohibiting [emancipation] existed, by simply saying, “go, you are 
free.”72 Eventually, states enacted statutes burdening both the process 
of emancipation and the right of manumission itself.73 However, until 
the courts abolished the Rule of Liberty, the canon routinely 
persuaded judges to confine these statutes to their literal terms.  
                                                 
 67. See, e.g., Renney v. Field, 4 Hayw. Tenn. 165, 165-70 (Tenn. 1817); 
Thornton v. Demoss, 5 S. & M. 609, 611, 618 (Miss. 1846); Thompson v. Newlin, 8 
Ired. Eq. 32, 46-47 (N.C. 1851); Field v. Milly Walker, 17 Ala. 80, 81-83 (1849); 
Clark v. Dick ex rel. 8 Fla. 360, 361, 367 (1859). This is why the southern courts 
refused to recognize freedom granted on habeas petitions in free states, because such 
cases could not actually adjudicate freedom. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fullerton, 1 
Randolph 15, 15-24 (Va. 1821).  
 68. Thompson v. Newlin, 8 Ired. Eq. 32, 46-47 (N.C. 1851). 
 69. Id. 
 70. MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810–1860, 205-
06 (1981).  
 71. Id.; Thompson, 8 Ired. Eq. at 46-47; Susan v. Ladd, 6 Dana 30, 30-31 
(Ky. 1837). 
 72. Jones v. Laney, 2 Tex. 342, 346-47 (1847); Guess v. Lubbock, 5 Tex. 
535, 550-51 (1851). See also M’Cutchin v. Price, 3 Hayw. Tenn. 195, 212 (Tenn. 
1817) (“A testator may direct that the executors shall endeavor to procure the 
emancipation of his slaves; and if the executor can do so, then all claims founded 
upon the legal impossibility of doing so, vanish.”); Jones v. Laney, 2 Tex. 342, 346-
47 (1847) (“In the absence of proof of any law, custom or usage . . . forbidding 
[emancipation], if the deed . . . be believed by the jury to be authentic, the plaintiffs 
are entitled to their freedom.”) 
 73. Greenlow v. Rawlings, 3 Humphreys 90, 90-94 (Tenn. 1842) (process); 
Frazier v. Frazier, 2 Hill Eq. 304, 305-17 (S.C. 1835) (right).  
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Two values sat at the heart of these cases. First was the 
common-law preference for liberty. Second was the right of the 
legislature to exercise its policymaking authority. When these values 
collided, the courts never questioned the legitimacy of either. 
Instead, they presumed that the legislature was not hostile to human 
freedom, but permitted clear text or intent to rebut this presumption. 
Thus, general restrictions on emancipation were simply designed to 
order the natural process of freeing humans from bondage, and the 
courts would not infer a legislative policy disfavoring emancipation 
unless clearly stated.74 Even total prohibitions on emancipation 
within the state were generally not construed to prohibit a master 
from sending his slave to another state to be free, since the 
prohibition was designed to protect citizens from the “danger” of a 
free African-American population.75 
                                                 
 74. Stewart v. Miller, 1 Meigs 574, 575-77 (Tenn. 1839) (“[S]ubstantial 
compliance” with the statute could support a grant of freedom, “although there may 
not be the most exact regularity in the proceeding.”); Rueben v. Parrish, 6 
Humphreys 116, 122-26 (Tenn. 1845) (technicalities are not “judicial acts necessary 
to perfect the emancipation, but are mere police regulations”); Greenlow, 3 
Humphreys at 90-94 (holding that if the county judge freed a slave, the appellate 
courts must “presume that the proof required . . . was made”) State v. Pitney, 1 Coxe 
165, 165 (N.J. 1793) (“The boy is entitled to his freedom, whether the administrators 
have given the security required by the act or not.”); Smith v. Adam, 18 B. Mon. 
685, 686-89, 692 (Ky. 1858); In re Moorman’s Will, 1 CATTERALL 93-94 (holding 
that where a testator manumitted slaves “if the law permits it,” the devise of freedom 
is valid even though the estate had to petition the assembly for a law permitting 
manumission after his death); Cox v. Williams, 6 Ired. Eq. 15, 16-17 (N.C. 1845); 
Thompson, 8 Ired. Eq. at 46-47; Alvany v. Powell, 1 Jones Eq. 35, 35-39 (N.C. 
1853) (“The reasons upon which [emigration conditions] are based, by no means 
make it necessary to hold that they have not capacity to take property until they have 
left the state. . . . With this saying, the humanity of our laws strikes his fetters at 
once, and says, go ‘enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.’”).  
 75. Jordan v. Bradley, 1 Dudl. Ga. 170, 171 (Ga. 1830); Antoinette ex rel. 
Roser v. Marlow, R.M.C. 542, 548 (Ga. 1837) (holding that the intent of the statute 
was solely to prevent a free black population in Georgia); Myrick v. Vineburgh, 30 
Ga. 161, 163 (1860) (holding that a will requiring slaves to be taken to a free state 
and there manumitted does not violate the anti-emancipation laws); Jones v. 
Abernathy, 11 Iredell 280 (N.C. 1850) (“A power . . . to manumit is not so 
absolutely incompatible with slavery, that they cannot co-exist under the same 
[federal] government.”); Shaw v. Brown, 35 Miss. 246, 311-13, 321 (1858) (“It was 
[the master’s] intention to locate them permanently where they could be free. [He] 
unquestionably had that right. The only restraint upon that right is, that he shall not 
emancipate them with the intent to bring them back as free persons.”); Atwood’s 
Heirs v. Beck, 21 Ala. 590, 614 (1852) (“There is nothing said, either in the 
Constitution, statutes or decisions of Alabama, about the power of the owner to 
remove his slaves to a non-slaveholding State” in order to free them); Ross v. 
Verner, 5 How. Miss. 305, 359 (1840); Leech v. Cooley, 6 S. & M. 93, 93, 98-99 
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These rationales are ameliorative. They placed the onus on the 
legislature to tell the courts if state policy was unfavorable to 
freedom in a particular context. But there were also suppletive cases. 
Some slave states justified this broad construction because “devises 
in favor of charities, and particularly those in favor of liberty, ought 
to be liberally expounded.”76 The leading case from this category was 
Isaac v. West.77 A condition to freedom became unlawful between 
the time a deed was executed and the time the right accrued.78 The 
dispute was over who benefited from the failure of the condition, 
between the heirs and the slave—and the Court sided with the slave:   
The deed may be construed to give immediate freedom, to all intents and 
purposes . . . If this condition was against Law, as inconsistent with the 
right granted, it would not frustrate the grant. . . . If this construction is 
doubtful, some weight is due to the maxim that every deed is to be taken 
most strongly against the grantor, and to the spirit of the Laws of all 
civilized nations which favours liberty.79 
In most states, legislatures responded to these cases with 
restrictive statutes or constitutional amendments. Some courts saw 
this as a cue to change course.80 However, even while giving full 
force to whatever was clear about the legislature’s intent, the courts 
construed these statutes narrowly at the margins.81  
In the late 1850s, most Southern courts abruptly reversed 
course and decided that the law ought to favor slavery.82 These cases 
                                                                                                       
(Miss. 1846) (“The mere collocation of words, if their meaning be the same, cannot 
vary their construction” if the testator tried to comply with the law in good faith).  
 76. Charles v. Hunnicutt, 5 Call 311, 311-12, 318-30 (Va. 1804). 
 77. Isaac v. West, 6 Randolph 652, 652-57 (Va. 1828). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (citing JUSTINIAN’S DIGEST and COKE’S INSTITUTES). 
 80. State v. Emmons, 1 Pennington 10, 11-14 (N.J. 1806) (abandoning 
precedent “in favor of liberty . . . supporting manumissions, which were not very 
precise and determinate”); Smith v. Adam, 18 B. Mon. 685, 686-89, 692 (Ky. 1858);  
 81. Kitty v. Commonwealth, 18 B. Mon. 522, 527-28 (Ky. 1857) (allowing 
a slave, freed before the amendments, to stay in the state notwithstanding that the 
constitution required her to leave the state); Walthall v. Robinson, 2 Leigh 189, 192-
95 (Va. 1830). 
82. Myers v. Williams, 5 Jones Eq. 362, 362-68 (N.C. 1860) (“The true 
principle of our law, in relation to . . . emancipation . . . is, that it permits, but does 
not favor it.”); Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 243-45, 252-56, 263-64 (1859) 
(“Mississippi came into the union . . . with this institution, . . . protected . . . by the 
express provisions of [the Federal] Constitution . . . Her climate, soil, and 
productions . . . require slave labor. [O]ur policy is [not] limited to the prevention of 
the increase of free negroes in this state.”); Spencer v. Dennis, 8 Gill 314, 318, 321 
(Md. 1849) (holding that the power to free slaves was not an existing right. It was 
granted by statute, and thus, a master must comply with the statute).  
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did not alter the relationship between the courts and the legislature—
instead, they simply replaced the common law’s preference for 
liberty with an invented preference for slavery:  
[T]he favor shown to liberty by the Common Law does not apply to 
negroes in Georgia. . . . It is not apparent, that up to this period, the true 
character of slavery had not been fully understood [by] the South . . . . 
[Slavery] was wisely ordained by a forecast high as heaven above man’s, 
for the good of both races, and [requires] a calm and fixed determination 
to preserve and defend it, at any and all hazards.83  
These restrictive statutes also sparked fights over what the 
courts called quasi-freedom. Masters, annoyed by laws that made it 
difficult to emancipate slaves, circumvented them by using the near-
infinite morass of future interests.84 A few states had no issue with 
these devices.85 One Delaware Judge explained the position this way:   
It is true that slavery is tolerated by our laws; but it is going too far to say 
that this kind of property in slaves is precisely like any other species of 
property. The spirit of the age and the principles of liberty and personal 
rights as held in this country are equally opposed to a doctrine drawn from 
the ages . . . of despotism.86 
Other states voided these contraptions as frauds upon the law.87 
These cases were uniformly based on the idea that a population of 
free, “entitled” African-Americans within the state was undesirable.88  
                                                 
 83. Cleland v. Waters, 16 Ga. 496, 508, 513-20 (1854); Drane v. Bell, 21 
Ga. 21, 39, 43 (1857). 
 84. TUSHNET, supra note 70, at 193-95. 
 85. Hope v. Johnson, 2 Yerger 123, 123-25 (Tenn. 1826); David v. 
Bridgman, 2 Yerger 557, 563 (Tenn. 1831) (permitting emancipation to exist as a 
contingent remainder following a life estate); Leiper v. Hoffman, 26 Miss. 615, 622-
23 (1853) (allowing a slave to hold a contingent interest in property placed in trust 
for her, and holding that if she did obtain freedom, her rights would immediately 
vest); Young v. Cavitt, 7 Heiskell 18, 30 (Tenn. 1871) (“There has always been an 
intermediate state between slavery and absolute freedom, recognized by our courts, 
in which the inchoate legal right to freedom, and the vested equitable right to its 
benefits, have been capable of being enforced.”); Purvis v.  Sherrod, 12 Tex. 140, 
164-65 (1854). 
 86. Jones v. Wootten, 1 Harrington 77, 84-85 (Del. 1833) (Harrington, J., 
dissenting).  
 87. Adams v. Gilliam, 1 Patt. & H. 161 (Va. 1855) (holding that the law 
does not recognize devises creating a quasi-free status between slavery and 
freedom); Redmond v. Coffin, 2 Dev. Eq. 437, 437-40 (N.C. 1831) (“Qualified 
emancipation . . . stands upon the same ground as a bequest directly for that 
purpose—however praiseworthy the motive for accepting such a trust, or however 
benevolent the will of the donor may be, it cannot be supported in a court of justice. 
A stern necessity arising out of the safety of the commonwealth forbids it.”); Dunlap 
v. Ingram, 4 Jones Eq. 178, 179-84 (N.C. 1858) (voiding a trust as an attempt to 
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These cases reflect two antithetical views on emancipation. 
One followed Somerset v. Stewart. Since slavery could only be 
sustained by positive law, all restrictions on emancipation must be 
stated clearly in the positive law and would be construed narrowly. 
Neither would a master’s failure to observe these requirements 
deprive a human being of freedom. The other view, invented by the 
slave states leading up to the War, rested on the opposite assumption. 
Free African-Americans were a curse upon democracy. Thus, 
restrictions on emancipation must sweep broadly, to protect whites 
from free African-Americans. A similar dynamic appeared in cases 
where an heir or a master tried to return a free person to slavery.  
2. Irrevocability & Deference 
Slavery is involuntary, and cannot cease to exist till the right of the master 
ceases with it. . . . This right, then, during the seven years residence of 
Lydia in Indiana, was not only suspended, but ceased to exist; and we are 
not aware of any law of this state which can bring into operation the right 
of slavery once destroyed . . . . For we cannot for a moment admit that the 
bare treading of our soil is thus dangerous.  
Kentucky Supreme Court, Rankin v. Lydia (1820)89 
Judgments are normally permanent.90 But cases involving 
human freedom were unique. One of the most striking of those cases 
was Findly v. Nancy.91 The master in Findly lost a freedom suit at 
law, but then asked a court of equity to order a new trial. The 
Chancellor refused:  
It may be a matter of some consideration . . . whether the chancellor ought, 
in any case, to grant a new trial at law, for the purpose of taking away a 
right of freedom gained at law. For as the chancellor will only interfere to 
take from a party a legal advantage, which, in conscience, he cannot 
retain, it may be doubted whether a right to freedom can ever be a claim of 
                                                                                                       
circumvent the emancipation laws, where the executors must hold the proceeds of 
the slaves’ labor for their own benefit); Dougherty v. Dougherty 2 Strob. Eq. 63, 63-
64, 67 (S.C. 1848); Thornton v. Chisholm, 20 Ga. 338, 339-41 (1856).  
 88. See, e.g., Myers v. Williams, 5 Jones Eq. 362, 362-68 (N.C. 1860); 
Morton v. Thompson, 6 Rich. Eq. 370, 370-75 (S.C. 1854). See generally cases cited 
in note 87.  
 89. Rankin v. Lydia, 2 A.K. Marsh. 467, 270-79 (Ky. 1820).  
 90. See Kevin Clermont, Civil Procedure’s Five Big Ideas, 2016 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 55, 94-95; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1942).  
 91. Findly v. Nancy, 3 T.B. Mon. 400, 400-02 (Ky. 1826). 
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that character. . . . The case which would warrant such interference ought 
to be strong and clear.92 
This sentiment pervaded judicial review of judgments in favor of 
freedom in many other states, even when the basis of the freedom 
claim was questionable.  
For example, a court in Tennessee held that a judgment in favor 
of freedom was immune from collateral attacks that the master was 
insane and that the lower court made some technical errors.93 Two 
judges in Virginia caused an appellate deadlock by “presuming in 
favor of liberty” that the jury inferred an essential fact of the freedom 
claim.94 One Pennsylvania court held that a county judge’s decision 
to free a slave on a writ of habeas corpus was not appealable at all.95 
The New York courts held that marriage of a free woman of color to 
a slave husband did not return her to slavery.96 New York also held 
that even a bona fide purchaser “could not make a free man a slave, 
much less authorize the sale of him.”97 Even the late Missouri courts 
held that freedom, once vested, could not be stripped away except as 
punishment for crime.98 
                                                 
 92. Id.  
 93. Hartsell v. George, 3 Humphreys 255, 255-57 (Tenn. 1842) (holding 
that these errors “do[] not invalidate the act of emancipation; . . . the act was 
consummate; . . . the character of the slave ceased . . . . [and] the jury had no right to 
inquire into the sanity of the [master] at the time the order of liberation was made”). 
 94. Coleman v. Dick and Pat, 1 Wash. Va. 233, 236-39 (Va. 1793) 
(affirming by an equally divided court); Betty v. Horton, 5 Leigh, 615, 624-25 (Va. 
1833). 
 95. Russell v. Commonwealth, 1 P. & W. 82, 82-83 (Pa. 1829). The trial 
judge ruled that “to hold [the slave] under the[se] circumstances, would be contrary 
to the spirit of the laws of Pennsylvania, for the gradual abolition of slavery.” Id. 
The court of appeals refused the appeal on the grounds that that “no writ of error 
will lie to remove a judgment upon a habeas corpus” petition.” Id.  
 96. Marbletown v. Kingston, 20 Johnson 1, 3 (N.Y. 1872) (“I cannot admit 
that by such a marriage, a free wife subjects herself to the custody and control of the 
slave husband . . . I am inclined to listen to the suggestions of policy and humanity, 
which I think dictate the rule, that the children of such marriages shall follow the 
condition of the free mother. . .”).  
 97. Livingston v. Bain, 10 Wendell 384, 384-86 (N.Y. 1833) (“The 
ignorance of all parties . . . could not make a free man a slave, much less authorize 
the sale of him . . . Although the sale in this case may not have been immoral . . . 
still it is nonetheless illegal.”); State v. Anderson, 1 Coxe 36, 36-37 (N.J. 1790) 
(“The hardship [pled] by the [purchaser] . . . ought not to be recompensed by the 
slavery of the child.”); Ponder v. Cox, 26 Ga. 485, 486-92 (1858).  
 98. Charlotte v. Choteau, 21 Mo. 590, 597 (1855) (“[W]hen any of the race, 
who were then reduced to slavery, acquired their freedom under the laws of the 
country in which they lived, we are aware of no law by which they, except for 
crime, could be again subjected to bondage. The principle that there is no 
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Freedom also vested by residence in a free state. The courts 
generally held that this right was inviolable except by an act of the 
legislature.99 The Kentucky courts noted that this inviolability came 
from Somerset’s rule that slavery cannot be supported except by 
positive law.100 Once a slave resided in a free state by the master’s 
permission, his right to that slave was gone.101 And as no positive law 
in Kentucky re-imposed slavery on a free person, the court could not 
do so.102 Even Deep South states, which “utterly repudiate[d] the 
whole current of decisions, from Somerset on down,” held that when 
a master takes his slaves to a free state, they became free, and could 
only be made slaves by a voluntary return to the slave state.103 
                                                                                                       
prescription against liberty, applied to them as well as to those of any other color.”); 
Blackbor v. Negro Phill, 7 Yerger 452, 453-66 (Tenn. 1835) (holding that even a 
design by the master to evade the emancipation laws “will not place them in the 
condition of slaves. If this State designed to make such acts nullities, then express 
enactments should be shown.”). 
 99. See Rankin v. Lydia, 2 A.K. Marsh. 467, 270-79 (Ky. 1820). Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407, 557 (1856) (McLean, J., dissenting); 
Davis v. Tingle, 8 B. Mon. 539, 545 (Ky. 1848); Mercer v. Gilman, 11 B. Mon. 210, 
210-12 (Ky. 1851); Hunter v. Fulcher, 1 Leigh 172, 182 (Va. 1829); Vaughan v. 
Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. 1115, 1118 (C.C. Ind. 1845).  
 100. Rankin, 2 A.K. Marsh. at 470-79 (“Slavery is sanctioned by the positive 
law of this state, . . . But we view this as a right existing by positive law . . . without 
foundation in the law of nature.”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. (“This right then, during the seven years residence of Lydia in 
Indiana, was not only suspended, but ceased to exist; and we are not aware of any 
law of this state which can bring into operation the right of slavery when once 
destroyed. . . . For we cannot for a moment admit, that the bare treading of 
[Kentucky] soil is thus dangerous.”). The courts limited this holding in 1844 to 
operate only as a suspension of the slave power when the slave was out of state, 
similar to the holding in The Slave Grace. See Graham v. Strader, 5 B. Mon. 173, 
177-82 (Ky. 1844). 
 103. Willis v. Jolliffe, 11 Rich. Eq. 447, 495-516 (S.C. 1860) (“They were 
free from the moment when, by the consent of their master, they were placed upon 
the soil of Ohio to be free. I have no idea that the soil of Ohio per se confers 
freedom. It is the act of the master which has that effect. . . . To permit the devise in 
their favor to operate is, we are told, contrary to the policy of South Carolina . . . But 
I should feel myself degraded if . . . I trampled on law and constitution, in obedience 
to popular will. There is no law in South Carolina which . . . declares that the trusts 
in their favor are void.”); Guillemette v. Harper, 4 Richardson 186, 187-92 (S.C. 
1850) (“[Somerset] carries the law further than I would willingly acknowledge. But 
if the master . . . assents in any way to his freedom, there can be no objection to the 
validity of freedom thus acquired. . . . If the slave [voluntarily] returns to a country 
where slavery is recognized, he ipso facto is remitted to his original condition.”); 
Cleland v. Waters, 19 Ga. 35, 40-42 (1855) (“I utterly repudiate the whole current of 
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In other cases, the irrevocability principle appeared as a version 
of equitable estoppel. Once a slave had acted free for several 
decades, the courts refused to void the right at the insistence of the 
master or his heirs, premised on some oversight104 or delay.105 The 
courts also permitted the slave to rely on oral promises that she was 
free,106 but barred masters from invoking the same rule.107 These 
                                                                                                       
decisions, from Somerset down. . . . Still, whenever removed to a free country to 
remain there permanently, they cease to be slaves.”). 
 104. Cully v. Jones, 9 Iredell 168, 168-69 (N.C. 1848) (“[W]e are clearly of 
the opinion that [the executor], whose duty it was to give the bond [cannot] take 
advantage of that omission. . . . After so long an acquiescence, almost anything will 
be presumed, in order to give effect to the act of emancipation.”); Mayo v. Whitson, 
2 Jones N.C. 231, 239 (N.C. 1855) (holding that after a half-century, the court’s 
failure to put the emancipation in the record would not permit the next of kin to 
claim the slave); Jarman v. Humphrey, 6 Jones N.C. 28, 28-31 (N.C. 1858) (When 
the master (1) acted like the slave was free in previous proceedings, and (2) 
acquiesced in the slave’s conduct as a free person for a long time, then “every 
presumption ought to be made in favor of his actual emancipation according to all 
the requirements of law.”); Oatfield v. Waring, 14 Johnson 188, 192-93 (N.Y. 1817) 
(“I have no doubt, that suffering the plaintiff to act as a free man, without any claim 
or pretence that he was a slave, until this suit was brought, would authorize the 
inference of a manumission . . . all presumptions in favor of personal liberty and 
freedom ought to be made.”); Scott v. Waugh, 15 S. & R. 17, 20-21 (Pa. 1826). But 
see, e.g., Mahan v. Jane, 2 Bibb. 32, 32-33 (Ky. 1810) (“Though in doubtful cases 
we may presume in favor of liberty, we cannot indulge it in a cause where the 
testimony is as clear and decidedly opposed to the verdict as this.”).  
 105. Judy ex rel. Monk v. Jenkins, 2 Hill Eq. 9, 9-14 (S.C. 1834) (“Until the 
seizure [of a wrongfully freed slave] is actually made, the emancipated slave must 
stand on the footing of any other free negro . . . the woman was never seized, and 
being now dead, never can be.”); Miller v. Regine,  2 Hill 592, 592-94 (S.C. 1835) 
(holding that when a slave had lived as a free person for twenty years, heirs could 
not challenge the emancipation); Wells v. Lane, 9 Johnson 144, 144-45 (N.Y. 1812) 
(“[A]fter such . . . a lapse of time, to authorize the plaintiff to claim her as his slave, 
would be extremely unjust.”). 
 106. Phebe ex rel. Pepoon v. Clarke, 1 Mill. 137, 137-38, 141 (S.C. 1817) 
(holding that when a master treated a slave as free and told people she was free, his 
heirs could not re-enslave her); State v. M’Donald, 1 Coxe 332, 335 (N.J. 1795) (“In 
equity, a thing agreed to be done is looked upon as done; and in a case where the 
liberty of a human being is involved—where the promise is coolly and deliberately 
made—it ought to receive from this court a similar construction. It is far better to 
adopt this rule than to suffer promises thus made, in a matter of so great 
consequence to a human creature, to be violated or retracted at pleasure.”); Tom v. 
Daily, 4 Ohio 368, 368, 371-73 (1831); Hinklin v. Hamilton, 3 Humphreys 569, 
569-75 (Tenn. 1842); Geer v. Huntington, 2 Root 364, 364 (Conn. 1796) (holding 
that one conversation where a mistress said her slave would be free at twenty-five 
was sufficient to prove freedom); United States v. Bruce, 25 Fed. Cas. 1279, 1280 
(D.C. App. 1813) (“As between the master and slave, [an] informal paper, with 
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cases rested on the same maxim: In Equity, “all presumptions in 
favor of personal liberty and freedom ought to be made.”108 
In a similar vein, the courts used this principle to put strict 
conditions on the master’s ability to revoke a grant of freedom, if 
they allowed him to do so at all. Some states held that even an 
informal grant of freedom was irrevocable.109 But nearly all states 
and the U.S. Supreme Court held that once a master executed a deed 
or will, the slave was free against all the world.110 In the words of one 
court: “‘Once free and always free,’ is the maxim of Maryland law . . 
. freedom having been once vested, by no compact between the 
master and the liberated slave, nor by any condition subsequent . . . 
can a state of slavery be reproduced.”111 
The rule also appeared as a form of deference to political 
actors. Several South Carolina courts refused to disturb jury verdicts 
granting freedom, reasoning that emancipation was “more of a 
political than legal character, and, in a great degree [must] be 
decided by public opinion.”112 One court in Tennessee refused to 
                                                                                                       
actual manumission, [is] valid”); Ralph v. Duncan, 3 Mo. 194, 196 (1833) (holding 
that giving a legal document to a slave could be sufficient to prove freedom). 
 107. Tongue v. Crissy, 7 Md. 453, 465 (1855); Isaac v. McGill, 9 
Humphreys 616, 616-19 (Tenn. 1848) (“There were only casual conversations in 
which some expressed their unwillingness to go to Africa. To hold that such 
conversations . . . should be their solemn decision to remain slaves, rather than be 
free, would outrage every principle of justice.”). 
 108. Oatfield v. Waring, 14 Johnson 188, 192-93 (N.Y. 1817). 
 109. Porter v. Blakemore, 2 Coldwell 556, 563-65 (Tenn. 1865) (holding that 
parol evidence is sufficient to establish a right to freedom when other circumstances 
suggest that it is reliable); Jones v. Laney, 2 Tex. 342, 346-47 (1847) (holding that 
an “owner could free his slave, provided no statute prohibiting [emancipation] 
existed, by simply saying, “go, you are free.”). 
 110. Manns v. Givens, 7 Leigh 452, 707-08, 710-19 (Va. 1836) (“[S]o far as 
the master is concerned, from the moment [the deed] is executed . . . it is final and 
complete. . . What power can the executor have to defeat his wishes by a revocation, 
or by seizing the slaves? Such a proposition appears to me to extravagant to be 
maintained.”); Fulton v. Shaw, 4 Randolph 597, 597-99 (Va. 1827) (a master cannot 
free a slave but retain an absolute right to enslave her children); Forward v. Thamer, 
9 Grattan 537, 538-39 (Va. 1853) (a master cannot divest his slaves of freedom by a 
condition subsequent); Town of Colombia v. Williams, 3 Conn. 467, 470-71 (Conn. 
1820) (holding that the words “set at liberty” put a slave “in a permanent condition 
of freedom, and implies the extinguishment of a right, which the master had over the 
slave, and not the mere cessation of actual authority.”); Fenwick v. Chapman, 9 Pet. 
461, 482 (1835) (“When an executor permits manumitted slaves to go at large and 
free . . . he cannot recall such assent by his own act.”).  
 111. Spencer v. Dennis, 8 Gill 314, 321 (Md. 1849).  
 112. White v. Comm’r, 3 Richardson 136, 136-41 (S.C. 1846) (3-2 decision) 
(“It would be difficult, if not impolitic, to define by . . . inflexible rules the line of 
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review a University’s interpretation of a land-grant statute that 
conferred 1,000 acres of land on a former slave.113 And when a 
statute gave county judges authority to give the state’s assent to 
freedom, judgments in favor of the slave were not reviewable.114 
These rules vanished as the South panicked over the prospect 
of abolition. In the words of one Georgia court: “Our law does not 
allow conveyances, nor contrivances, nor time, to convert a slave 
into a free man.”115 A North Carolina court reversed a verdict in 
favor of freedom even when the evidence was in conflict.116 Other 
courts abolished the reliance arguments, rejecting emancipations not 
made in the precise form required by law.117 The same courts seemed 
unconcerned about applying legislation retroactively to void gifts of 
freedom that were lawful when made.118 When slaves insisted that 
this injured their vested right to freedom, the courts responded 
stiffly: “The law declares them chattels.”119 
Before the demise of the Rule of Liberty, the law in these cases 
was rooted in the Somerset tradition. Slavery could only be 
supported by positive law, and once a master surrendered that right, 
the gravitational pull of the common law resisted all but the clearest 
                                                                                                       
separation . . . the question of the reception of colored persons into the class of 
citizens, must partake more of a political than legal character, and, in a great degree, 
be decided by public opinion, expressed in the verdict of a jury.”); Sally v. Beaty, 1 
Bay 260, 260-62 (S.C. 1792) (“If the [slave] chose to appropriate the savings of her 
extra labour to the purchase of this girl, in order afterwards to set her free, would a 
jury of the country say no? [The trial judge] trusted not. They were too humane and 
upright, he hoped, to do such manifest violence to so singular and extraordinary act 
of benevolence.”). 
 113. University v. Cambreling, 6 Yerg. 79, 79, 85-86 (Tenn. 1834) (“This 
argument is addressed to us in vain. The board of commissioners of North Carolina 
has . . . adjudged that the negro Frederick . . . was entitled to [the land]. [This is] 
conclusive.”). 
 114. Lewis v. Simonton, 8 Humphreys 185, 185-91 (Tenn. 1847) (“The 
proceedings of the tribunal entrusted by law to give the assent of the state [to 
emancipation] cannot be impeached . . . unless upon their face they be absolutely 
void.”); Greenlow v. Rawlings, 3 Humphreys 90, 90-94 (Tenn. 1842). 
 115. Escheator v. Candler, 30 Ga. 275, 277 (1860). 
 116. Bookfield v. Stanton, 6 Jones N.C. 156 (N.C. 1858). 
 117. Redmond v. Murray, 30 Mo. 570, 575 (1860) (“Manumission is a mere 
gratuity under our laws, and a mere intention or promise by the master, not 
consummated in the manner pointed out by law, however solemn such promise may 
be made, can confer no power or capacity to have it enforced.”) 
 118. Gordon v. Blackman, 1 Rich Eq. 61, 61-66 (S.C. 1844), on reh’g, 
Blackman v. Gordon, 2 Rich. Eq. 43, 43-45 (1845); Finley v. Hunter, 2 Strob. Eq. 
208, 208-09 (S.C. 1848). 
 119. See id.  
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statements by the legislature. The later cases, inverting this principle, 
required textual or intentional clarity from the master or the 
legislature before they would enforce the right to freedom. These 
decisions are necessarily rooted in the mirror-image of Somerset: 
That the natural order of things favors slavery, and that nothing, 
short of positive law, can free a slave or give him rights.  
3. Primacy 
It has also been contended in argument, that although the compact vested a 
right to freedom, as yet it was never acknowledged . . . the right cannot be 
coerced. As well might it be said that a vested right of inheritance by an 
heir held by an intruder, could have no remedy . . . If rights of property 
can thus be coerced by appropriate remedies, much more ought the right to 
freedom, compared with which, all other rights sink into insignificance. 
Kentucky Supreme Court, Rankin v. Lydia (1820)120 
Antebellum litigation often involved multiple claimants 
asserting a right to slave. Unfortunately, one of those claimants often 
was the slave. Most courts solved this conflict by declaring that the 
right to freedom prevailed over property rights.121 The courts also 
looked with disfavor on complaints that freeing the slave would 
deprive a master of their vested rights. The Mississippi Courts, 
confronting one such conflict, noted wryly: 
What are these vested rights, are they derived from nature, or from the 
municipal law? Slavery is condemned by reason and the laws of nature. It 
exists and can only exist, through municipal regulations, and in matters of 
doubt, is it not an unquestioned rule that courts must lean in favorem vitae 
et libertatis? . . . [T]he [masters] say, you take from us a vested right 
arising from municipal law. The [slaves] say you would deprive us of a 
natural right guaranteed by the ordinance and the constitution. How should 
the Court decide, if construction were to really determine it? I presume it 
would be in favour of liberty. . .”122 
In cases where creditors pursued slaves to settle debts, the 
courts routinely found that emancipation had priority over all other 
financial interests.123 In most states, creditors could only reach the 
                                                 
 120. Rankin v. Lydia, 2 A.K. Marsh. 467, 470-79 (Ky. 1820). 
 121. See, e.g., id.; Harry v. Decker & Hopkins, 1 Walk. Miss. 36, 42 (Miss. 
1818). 
 122. Id.; Jarrot v. Joseph, 2 Gilman 1, 6-11, 23-30 (Ill. 1845). 
 123. See, e.g., Susan v. Ladd, 6 Dana 30, 149-51 (Ky. 1837) (“Slaves . . .  
occupy the double character of property and legatees, or quasi legatees. And, as 
freedom is a legacy above all price, humanity, justice, and the spirit of the laws, 
inculcate the propriety of placing them in the most favored class of legatees.”); 
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slave after all other assets were exhausted—and even then, they 
could only hire them out until the debt was paid.124 Creditors could 
not choose to take freed slaves over less liquid forms of property.125  
In other cases, the grant of freedom superseded property 
interests and other testamentary maxims. Reasoning that “there is a 
manifest difference between a gift of freedom and a gift of property,” 
the Tennessee and Kentucky courts held that the Rule Against 
Perpetuities did not apply to grants of freedom.126 Dower rights were 
also inferior to gifts of freedom.127 And even donations to charity, 
which received favorable treatment at common law, failed before 
grants of freedom, “lest it might deprive some or all of the 
manumitted slaves of . . . that liberty secured to them by [the 
testator’s] benevolence and humanity, which is supposed to have 
been an act no less meritorious” than gifts to charity.128  
As the sectional crisis deepened, the South retreated from this 
super-strong rule. The North Carolina courts made emancipation an 
ordinary property right.129 Neither did emancipation prevent sale, 
                                                                                                       
Parks v. Hewlett, 9 Leigh 511, 522-23 (Va. 1838) (“Emancipation is not strictly a 
gift of property. It is the exoneration of a human being from the bonds which our 
institutions have fastened on him, and which the beneficence of our times has 
authorized the master to remove.”). The only exception to this rule was in cases of 
actual fraud. Woodley v. Abby, 5 Call. 336, 336-37 (Va. 1805). But even this was 
not a unanimous rule. See id. at 342 (Tucker & Roane, JJ., dissenting). In another 
case, creditors who could have (but did not) perfect their security interest in a slave 
before the master emancipated him could not recover the slaves even on a showing 
of actual fraud. Milly v. Smith, 2 Mo. 171, 173-75 (1829).  
 124. See, e.g., Dunn v. Amey, 1 Leigh 465, 471-72 (Va. 1829); Ferguson v. 
Sarah, 4 J.J. Marsh. 103, 105 (Ky. 1830); Harry v. Green, 9 Humphreys 182, 183-85 
(Tenn. 1848); Armstrong v. Pearre, 7 Coldwell 171, 176-78 (Tenn. 1869) (“The 
bequest of freedom is of a higher nature than a pecuniary legacy, and . . . will not 
abate . . . to satisfy such a legacy, or be compelled to contribute if it is absorbed by 
the debts.”); But see Allein v. Sharp, 7 Gill & John. 96, 106-08 (Md. 1835) 
(requiring the rest of the estate to be sold before the slaves, but permitting them to 
be sold at that point).  
 125. Wilson v. Barnett, 9 Gill & John. 158, 163-64 (Md. 1837).  
 126. Wood v. Humphreys, 12 Grattan 333, 333-34, 338-42 (Va. 1855); 
Ludwig v. Combs, 1 Met. Ky. 128, 131-32 (Ky. 1858). But see Woodland v. Wallis, 
6 Md. 151, 165 (1854) and Smith v. Dunwoody, 19 Ga. 237, 256, 260 (1856).  
 127. Lee v. Lee, 1 Dana 48, 48 (Ky. 1833); Graham v. Sam, 7 B. Mon. 403, 
406 (Ky. 1847).  
 128. William & Mary Coll. v. Hodgson, 6. Munford 163, 163-65 (Va. 1818).  
 129. Cox v. Williams, 6 Ired. Eq. 15, 19 (N.C. 1845) (“[T]he owner of a 
slave cannot defeat the rights of a creditor by manumitting the slave.”); Bennehan’s 
Ex’or v. Norwood, 5 Ired. Eq. 106, 109 (N.C. 1847); 
24 © 2017 Chris Kozak  
because creditors need not obligated to wait indefinitely for 
payment.130 Other states privileged creditors over emancipation.131 
Until the states began repudiating the Rule of Liberty, the 
Courts almost uniformly treated freedom as superior to property. 
This superiority prevailed even when the interest was held by an 
innocent third party. Thus, the rule was founded not on the injustice 
of holding a human in slavery, but on the sheer power of the natural 
right to freedom. Had this rule rested on a common-law distaste for 
slavery alone, the courts would not have permitted emancipation to 
prejudice the rights of innocent third parties. Instead, it was rooted in 
the common-law conviction that “freedom is a legacy above all 
price,”132 and so property rights were necessarily inferior to it.  
4. Rights Inherent in Freedom 
Freedom in this country is not a mere name . . . and it makes itself 
manifest by many public acts . . . transfers its possessor, even if he be 
black, or mulatto, or copper-colored, from the kitchen and the cotton-field, 
to the court-house, and the election ground. . . . In some states renders him 
a politician, takes him to the ballot box—and above all, secures to him . . . 
trial by jury. 
Tennessee Supreme Court, Vaughan v. Phebe (1827)133 
Once free African-Americans became more numerous, the 
courts were confronted with their role in deciding the status of a free 
person of color. The states vehemently disagreed on this subject, but 
the majority rule was that freedom itself conferred all civil rights on 
a person without further legislation. They usually left it to the 
legislature, however, to confer political rights, like the right to vote.  
The courts of South Carolina, Maryland, Mississippi, Alabama, 
Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Indiana, 
Wisconsin, and Texas held that the very status of freedom gave 
people of color the right to acquire, hold, transmit, and dispose of 
property on equal terms with white persons.134 The Pennsylvania 
                                                 
 130. Shaw v. McBride, 3 Jones Eq. 173, 173-76 (N.C. 1857); Lane v. 
Bennett, 3 Jones Eq. 390, 392, 394 (N.C. 1857). 
 131. Bynum v. Bostick, 4 Dessaussure 266, 267 (S.C. 1812) George v. 
Corse, 2 Har. & Gill. 1, 2, 8 (Md. 1827). 
 132. Susan v. Ladd, 6 Dana 30, 149-51 (Ky. 1837).  
 133. Vaughan v. Phebe, 1 Mart. & Yerg. 5, 5-7 (Tenn. 1827). 
 134. In re Real Estate of Hardcastle, 2 Harper 495, 498-501 (S.C. 1826); 
Carmille v. Carmille, 2 McMullan 454, 454-56, 469-72 (S.C. 1842); Bowers v. 
Newman, 2 McMullan 472, 486-89 (S.C. 1842); Hughes v. Jackson, 12 Md. 450, 
463 (1858); Shaw v. Brown, 35 Miss. 246, 320 (1858) (“[F]ree negroes are only 
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courts described these rights as “incident to the grant of his 
freedom.”135  
Most states also held that unless the positive law imposed 
disabilities, the free black person had the same inherent personal 
rights as the white person. These included the rights to sue,136 to 
demand due process,137 to petition for habeas corpus,138 to testify,139 to 
pursue a lawful profession,140 to be free from unreasonable 
                                                                                                       
debarred, by our laws, of the rights secured to them . . . so far as the exercise of 
those rights may be positively prohibited, or may be directly dangerous to the 
conditions of our slaves.”); Mathews v. Springer, 16 Fed. Cas. 1096, 1098-99 (2 
Abb. U.S. 283) (1871); Berry v. Alsop, 45 Miss. 1, 10 (1871); Tannis v. Doe ex rel. 
St. Cyre, 21 Ala. 449, 453-54 (1852) (“[I]ncapacity [to hold property] can only be 
fixed upon [a free person or color or an emancipated slave] by express legislative 
enactment, or by necessary implication.”); Nelson v. Smithpeter, 2 Coldwell 13, 13-
15 (Tenn. 1865) (holding that the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment 
inherently gave former slaves the right to hold property); Foremans v. Tamm, 1 
Grant 23, 23-25 (Pa. 1853) (“The effect of the manumission is to give the colored 
man the right to acquire and dispose of lands as fully as the white man . . . [as] an 
incident to the grant of his freedom. There is nothing in the [law] . . . that excludes 
the colored man.”); Town of Colchester v. Town of Lynne, 13 Conn. 274, 275, 278 
(1839); Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cushing 198, 204-09 (Mass. 1849); Smith v. 
Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 300-01, 303-07 (1866); In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 15-18 (1854); 
Webster v. Heard, 32 Tex. 685, 710 (1870). 
 135. Foremans, 1 Grant at 23-25. 
 136. State v. Bender, 3 Harrington 572, 574 n. (Del. 1793) (“Negroes are 
allowed the same redress for injuries to their persons as whites. . .”). 
 137. Mayor v. Winfield, 8 Humphreys 707, 707-10 (Tenn. 1848). 
 138. See Renney v. Field, 4 Hayw. Tenn. 165, 165-70 (Tenn. 1817); 
Weddington v. Sam, 15 B. Mon. 147, 154-55 (Ky. 1854); Coston v. Coston, 25 Md. 
500, 500-01 (1866); In re Turner, 24 Fed. Cas. 337, 337-40 (1 Abbot U.S. 84) 
(Chase, Chief Justice); State v. Philpot, 1 Dudl. Ga. 46, 49-52 (Ga. 1831). 
 139. State v. Bender, 3 Harrington 572, 574 n. (Del. 1793); United States v. 
Mullany, 27 Fed. Cas. 20, 22 (D.C. App. 1808) (“[C]olor alone does not disqualify a 
witness.”); Handy v. Clark, 4 Houston 16, 16-18 (Del. 1869); Gurnee v. Dessies, 1 
Johnson 508, 508 (N.Y. 1806). 
 140. Carey v. Washington, 5 Fed. Cas. 62, 66 (D.C. App. 1836) (“Although 
free colored persons have not the same political rights which are enjoyed by free 
white persons, yet they have the same civil rights, except so far as they are abridged 
by the general law of the land. Among these civil rights, is the right to exercise any 
lawful and harmless trade, business, or occupation.”); The William Jarvis, 29 Fed. 
Cas. 1309, 1310 (C.C. Mass. 1859) (holding that a Louisiana law was 
unconstitutional because it prohibited free seamen of color from going ashore with 
white people. “It is no avail to say that Congress have not, in express terms, said that 
negroes may be seamen on board of American vessels. It is sufficient that there is no 
prohibition, and that all persons, of every shade of color, stand upon the same 
ground of right to constitute part of the crew.”).  
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punishments and restraints on free choice,141 and to invoke the 
protection of the state from violence.142 Some states even allowed 
freed slaves to sue their masters for wrongful enslavement.143 
The real conflict between the states centered around the right to 
vote. Some states held that the act of giving freedom itself 
“adopt[ed] into the body politic a new member”144 and obligated the 
government to respect their rights on the same level as those of a 
white man.145 Michigan, confronting the intervening effect of the 
Thirteenth Amendment on its election law, declared:  
The reasons for drawing distinctions between classes are notorious; the 
course of events has, with the destruction of slavery, . . . modified public 
opinions. . . . We cannot truly interpret our Constitution upon voting, 
without consideration to the fact that it sprang from prejudice. . . . We 
have never attempted to make color a test of veracity in the witness box. . . 
[N]o one has advanced the notion that a preponderance of mixed blood . . 
has any bearing upon fitness to possess political privileges.146 
This perspective on freedom demanded that “[i]f the rights of the 
black man are to be assailed, let it be done boldly.”147 
Other states held that free persons of color had no political 
rights,148 and some of the more liberal states later overruled decisions 
                                                 
 141. Cooper & Warsham v. City of Savannah, 4 Ga. 58, 74-75 (1845) 
(holding that a free person of color could not be imprisoned for the failure to pay a 
fine or a debt); Banks v. Banks, 2 Coldwell 546, 550-55 (Tenn. 1865) (holding that 
abolition voided a legal requirement that a slave leave the state to claim property).  
 142. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 15-18 (1854) (holding that a free person of color  
“is entitled to the full protection of our laws; so long as he is unclaimed.”); Bender, 
3 Harrington at 574 n. (Del. 1793) (“Negroes are allowed the same redress for 
injuries to their persons as whites. . .”). 
 143. Paup v. Mingo, 4 Leigh 163, 176, 180-87 (Va. 1833); Scott v. Williams, 
1 Devereux 376, 376 (N.C. 1828); Matilda v. Crenshaw, 4 Yerger 299, 300, 304-05 
(Tenn. 1833). Other states allowed the claim, but limited it to cases where the right 
to freedom was clearly established. Warfield v. Davis, 14 B. Mon. 40, 43 (Ky. 
1853). Other states rejected the tort. Russell v. Cantwell, 5 S.C. 477 (S.C. 1874). 
 144. Fisher’s Negroes v. Dabbs, 6 Yerger 119, 120-32 (Tenn. 1834). 
 145. G.H. MOORE, NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN MASSACHUSETTS 
7; Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cushing 198, 204-09 (Mass. 1849). 
 146. People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406, 414-19, 422-25 (1866); Coger v. N.W. 
Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145, 146-60 (1873) (“In our opinion the plaintiff was 
entitled to the same rights and privileges . . . The doctrines of natural law and 
Christianity forbid that rights be denied on the ground of race or color.”); Town of 
Colchester v. Town of Lynne, 13 Conn. 274, 275, 278 (1839) (“The master of [a] 
slave, by relinquishing all claims to service and obedience, effectually emancipated 
her; and thus she became sui juris, and entitled to all the rights and privileges of 
other free citizens”). 
 147. Brittle v. People, 2 Neb. 198, 204-09, 222-25 (Neb.) 
 148. See, e.g., Bowers v. Newman, 2 McMullan 472, 486-89 (S.C. 1842). 
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treating free persons of color equally.149 Many of these decisions 
invoked reasoning eerily similar to that which would later appear in 
Dred Scott.150 Georgia asserted that manumission conferred nothing 
except the right to movement, and that the free African-American 
had no rights except by statute.151 These cases, therefore, wholly 
repudiated the Rule of Liberty. However, other states held that while 
free persons of color had less rights than white persons, this was only 
because the slave clauses in the U.S. Constitution precluded the 
political freedom of the African-American.152 All political rights, 
therefore, must be conferred by statute.153 
Another set of cases involved segregation. Some free states, 
while acknowledging the equal rights of persons of color, endorsed 
segregation.154 Other courts held that mixed-race children had a right 
to attend white schools.155 These states reasoned that segregation was 
illegal unless authorized by a “sovereign authority.”156 
There is significant disagreement in these cases. But there are 
two lessons to be drawn from this brief survey. First, most states—
even deep south states—recognized that civil and personal rights 
vested in the African-American simply by being free. In fact, some 
courts held that depriving slaves of these rights must be done by 
                                                 
 149. State v. Claiborne, 1 Meigs 331, 338-41 (Tenn. 1839). 
 150. See, e.g., id. (“Free negroes have always been a degraded race in the 
United States . . . with whom public opinion has never permitted the white 
population to associate on terms of equality, and in relation to whom, the laws have 
never allowed . . . the immunities of the free white citizen. . . . But free negroes were 
never [citizens] in any of the States. . . . in the sense of Magna Charta, or of our 
Constitution.”). 
 151. Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 198-201 (1853) (“[T]he status of the 
African in Georgia, whether bond or free, is such that he has no civil, social, or 
political rights or capacity, whatever, except such as are bestowed upon him by 
statute. The act of manumission confers no other right but . . . freedom from the 
dominion of the master, and the limited liberty of locomotion . . . to become a 
citizen of the body politic, capable of contracting, of marrying, of voting, requires 
something more than the mere act of enfranchisement.”). 
 152. Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 553-54, 556-60 (Pa. 1837) (holding that a 
person “though free as the winds,” “may be no freeman in respect of its 
government.” The court admitted that the issue was ambiguous, but resolved doubt 
considering the bargain struck by the Constitutional Convention); Hudgins v. 
Wrights, 1 Hen. & M. 134, 137 (Va. 1806) (holding that the Bill of Rights only 
protects whites).  
 153. E.g., Foremans v. Tamm, 1 Grant 23, 23-25 (Pa. 1853).  
 154. Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cushing 198, 204-09 (Mass. 1849); Burton 
v. Schepf, 83 Mass. 133, 134-36 (1861). 
 155. Van Camp v. Logan, 9 Ohio St. 406, 412-15 (1859). 
 156. Clark v. Bd. of Directors, 24 Iowa 266, 269-77 (1868). 
28 © 2017 Chris Kozak  
legislation. Second, Chief Justice Taney’s view of African-
Americans was in a distinct minority. Most states did afford free 
blacks civil rights; there were common-law rights that the white man 
was bound to respect. Most states also held that the legal disabilities 
of African-Americans stemmed from necessity, safety, racial purity, 
or some policy mandate—and not, as Chief Justice Taney thought, 
from the supposed inherent inferiority of the black man.  
The weight of authority in these cases paints a picture of an 
antebellum judiciary that firmly believed in the Somerset vision of 
freedom. Moreover, they felt empowered to enforce it. Freedom 
existed in the law of nature, and could only be restricted by clear, 
positive law. Once given, freedom from slavery could not be 
revoked. When the right to freedom and the right to property 
conflicted, the presumption was in favor of liberty. And when the 
positive-law disabilities of slavery were removed, the freed man—by 
default—gained civil and personal rights (at least), or citizenship (at 
most). This was the core of the Rule of Liberty. But the canon also 
appeared in a procedural context, beating back a perennial enemy of 
civil rights: Formalism. 
B. Liberty and Formalism 
Formalism—the rigid adherence to an existing legal 
framework—has frustrated more than one attempt at protecting civil 
rights.157 This is not a new phenomenon. In the nineteenth century, 
formalism provided courts with opportunities to make emancipation 
practically impossible. Property could not sue; how, then, could 
slaves enforce a deed giving them freedom? Even if a slave could 
sue, his master had the right to control his movement. And even if a 
slave could gather evidence, many freedom claims rested on ancestry 
from a free mother—things that might only be provable through 
hearsay.  But when a master offered formalism in argument, the Rule 
of Liberty frequently beat it back and afforded the slave a window to 
assert his claim, if indeed he had one.   
  
                                                 
 157. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23-33; Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev’d 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Tyler v. Cain, 533 
U.S. 656, 662-68 (2001); Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630-31 (2013).  
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1. Capacity & Standing 
Although the law of this state considers slaves as property, yet it 
recognizes their personal existence, and, to a qualified extent, their natural 
rights. [They] must, of course, have a right to seek and enjoy the 
protection of the law in the establishment of all legal documents of 
emancipations . . . to this extent, the general reason of policy which 
disables slaves as persons, and subjects them to the brute condition of 
property, does not apply; and the reason ceasing, the law ought also to 
cease. 
Kentucky Supreme Court, In re Bodine (1836) 
A slave generally could not “do anything, have anything, or 
acquire anything, but what must belong to his master.”158 Thus, in 
capacity cases, the courts routinely confronted the first paradox of 
slavery: Are slaves people or property?159 Formalism required courts 
to choose one box or the other. For the overwhelming majority of 
judges, however, recognizing the right to freedom without a remedy 
to enforce it violated basic maxims of the legal system.160 Thus, 
many courts ameliorated the harsh doctrines of formalism with their 
powers of equity, at least until the system collapsed into the rule that 
slavery was a natural-law good.  
The southern states generally “suppose[d] that a slave, who is 
capable of nothing else, is at least capable to take his freedom.”161 
There were at least three different rationales for this relaxation of the 
slave codes. Georgia rejected the formalist interpretation because it 
was “too technical” and because it would effectively abolish 
emancipation as a legal device.162 Virginia took an equally pragmatic 
approach: Allowing emancipation but refusing standing would “keep 
the promise to the ear, and break it to the hope.”163 
                                                 
 158. Slave, A NEW DICTIONARY & GLOSSARY (1st ed. 1850). 
 159. See generally ALLAIN, at 105-130; TUSHNET 157-88. 
 160. See Ashby v. White, 1 Eng. Rep. 417 (1703) (Holt, C.J., dissenting) (“If 
then when a statute gives a right, the party shall have an action for the infringement 
of it, is it not as forcible when a man has his right by the common law?”). 
 161. E.g., Manns v. Givens, 7 Leigh 452, 710-19 (Va. 1836); Peters v. Van 
Lear, 4 Gill 249, 262-65 (Md. 1846); Redding v. Findley, 4 Jones Eq. 216, 217 
(N.C. 1858) (“[T]here is inherent legal capacity to assent to all those incidents which 
go to make the emancipation itself effectual.”). 
 162. Cleland v. Waters, 19 Ga. 35, 40-42 (1855). 
 163. Manns v. Givens, 7 Leigh 452, 710-19 (Va. 1836) (“In giving them an 
interest in having the deed proved, the act of assembly gave them a right also to 
have it done: otherwise it would indeed ‘keep the promise to the ear, and break it to 
the hope.’”) 
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Kentucky and Tennessee provided more complete reasoning. 
Although slaves were property, the law recognized freedom as a 
natural right.164 Thus, in these cases, slaves “must be considered as 
natural persons, entitled to some legal rights . . . and, to this extent, 
the general reason of policy which disables slaves as persons, and 
subjects them to the condition of brute property, does not apply; and 
the reason ceasing, the law ought also to cease.”165 The recognition of 
the natural right to freedom was crucial: The common law refused to 
contemplate the absurdity of a right without a remedy.166 Thus, if the 
natural law held that a slave could be freed, that right was forcible 
even if the positive law did not acknowledge it.167 
Like they did in other contexts, the courts eventually began to 
cut back the Rule of Liberty. Most states held that slaves could not 
contract for their freedom168 or enforce contract rights to freedom in 
disputes between third parties.169 Virginia and Alabama reversed 
course and held that nothing but the positive law could give the 
                                                 
 164. In re Bodine, 4 Dana 476, 476-78 (Ky. 1836); Ford v. Ford, 7 
Humphreys 92, 92-98 (Tenn. 1846) (“A slave is not in the condition of a horse . . . 
he is made after the image of the Creator. He has mental capacities, and an immortal 
principle in his nature, that constitute him equal to his owner, but for the accidental 
position in which fortune has placed him . . . the laws cannot extinguish his high 
born nature, nor deprive him of the many rights which are inherent in man . . . he 
can make a contract for his freedom, which our laws recognize, and he can take a 
bequest of his freedom, and by the same will he can take personal or real estate.”). 
 165. In re Bodine, 4 Dana at 476-78. 
 166. Id. (“Unless, then, there can be such an absurdity as a legal right 
without any remedy, the plaintiffs may proceed in their own proper names.”). 
 167. Cf. Ashby v. White, 1 Eng. Rep. 417 (1703) (Holt, C.J., dissenting); 
Rankin v. Lydia, 2 A.K. Marsh. 467, 470-79 (Ky. 1820) (“If rights of property can 
thus be coerced by appropriate remedies, much more ought the right to freedom, 
compared with which, all other rights sink into insignificance.”). In some cases, the 
right to freedom prevailed even where other procedural hiccups could have 
technically obstructed it. See Bell v. Jones, 10 Md. 322, 323-30 (1856) (refusing, on 
a successive petition for freedom, to apply a fee-shifting statute to force a slave to 
pay the master’s legal costs for defending the first petition); Mary v. Talburt, 16 
Fed. Cas. 949, 949 (D.C. App. 1831) (holding that a slave’s act of running away did 
not bar a subsequent petition for freedom); Thornton v. Davis, 23 Fed. Cas. 1147, 
1148 (D.C. App. 1835) (refusing to “suffer the merits of [a freedom case] to be 
smothered in the technicalities of special pleading.”). 
 168. Shanklin v. Johnson, 9 Ala. 271, 274-75 (1846); Clark v. Pease, 41 N.H. 
414, 416 (1860); Contee v. Garner, 6 Fed. Cas. 361, 361 (D.C. App. 1818); Hall v. 
United States, 2 U.S. (Otto) 27, 29-30 (1875) (applying Mississippi law). But see 
Logan v. Commonwealth, 2 Grattan 571, 572-74 (Va. 1845); Ford, 7 Humphreys at 
92-98.  
 169. Thompson v. Wilmot, 1 Bibb. 422, 422-24 (Ky. 1809); Major v. Winn, 
13 B. Mon. 250, 251-52 (Ky. 1852).  
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slaves the power to choose freedom, much less enforce it.170 This rule 
necessarily either (1) abandoned the right–remedy mandate in slave 
cases because the common law did not protect slaves,171 or (2) 
concluded that the slave could have no legal right to freedom at all.  
Until the Southern states began to see slavery as a natural-law 
good, courts uniformly held that the slave codes were necessities, not 
fundamental truths.172 This assumption was grounded in Somerset 
and the western tradition that slavery must have support in statutory 
law. The Somerset logic also demanded that any civil disabilities of 
slaves come from positive law. Since these laws were regulatory, 
they prevailed in other civil matters. But when the natural right to 
freedom was concerned, the positive-law reason for the law ceased, 
and therefore, the law ceased with it.  
2. Presumptions & Proof 
All presumptions should be indulged in favor of human freedom. 
Kentucky Supreme Court, Davis v. Tingle (1848).173 
Ordinarily, a rebuttable presumption of slavery rested upon an 
African-American.174 But this presumption applied only in clear 
                                                 
 170. Bailey v. Poindexter, 14 Grattan 132, 197 (Va. 1858) (3-2 decision); 
Williamson v. Carter, 14 Grattan 394 (Va. 1858); Hooper v. Hooper, 32 Ala. 669, 
673 (1858) (“[T]he owner’s executor . . . will . . . not be compelled by the court, at 
the instance of the slave, to carry him to the state to which the will directs him to be 
carried for emancipation.”) 
 171. See Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 579 (1851) (“If the common law be 
applicable to a state of slavery, it would seem to be applicable as much in one as 
another particular. If it protects the life of the slave, why not his liberty? And if it 
protects his liberty, then it breaks down, at once, the status of the slave. . . it is 
absurd to talk about the Common Law being applicable to an institution which it 
would destroy.”) 
 172. See 2 CATTERALL at 267 (quoting a southern judge who spoke of “such 
limitations and guards as rendered the free negro, not dangerous but as a useful 
member of the community, however humble he might be.”); Redmond v. Coffin, 2 
Dev. Eq. 437, 437-40 (N.C. 1831) (citing “a stern necessity arising out of the safety 
of the commonwealth”); Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 553-54, 556-60 (Pa. 1837) 
(lamenting “the necessity of [slave] disabilities”); Tindal v. Hudson, 2 Harrington 
441, 442-43 (Del. 1838) (speaking of the “necessary relations of master and slave”).  
 173. Davis v. Tingle, 8 B. Mon. 539, 544-45 (Ky. 1848). 
 174. Davis v. Curry, 2 Bibb. 238, 238 (Ky. 1810); Fox v. Lambson, 3 
Halsted 275, 277-78 (N.J. 1826) (“Color . . . affords a presumption of slavery.”); 
Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 Fed. Cas. 840, 843, 855 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1833) (“It is not 
permitted to you or us to indulge our feelings of abstract right . . . the law of the land 
recognizes the right of one man to hold another in bondage.”); Scott v. Williams, 1 
Devereux 376 (N.C. 1828). 
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cases. In other cases, the courts almost uniformly refused to indulge 
in a presumption of slavery. For most courts, there were too many 
“probabilities . . . in favor of the liberty of these persons, [and] they 
ought not to be deprived of it on mere presumption.”175  
Thus, whenever someone was not clearly of pure African 
descent, the burden of proof lay on the person asserting the right to 
slavery, regardless of the litigating posture of the parties.176 Any 
other rule “would lead us into darkness, doubt, and uncertainty, for 
they are as various as the admixture of blood between the races, and 
against the rule that presumptions are always in favor of liberty.”177 
This same rule automatically reversed the presumption in favor of 
slavery when the person had been permitted to act as a free person.178  
Other courts went further. Justice Story held in 1822 that, as 
the slave trade was an offense against both the law of nature and the 
                                                 
 175. Gobu v. Gobu, 1 Taylor N.C. 164, 101 (N.C. 1802) (“I am not aware 
that the doctrine of presuming against liberty, has been urged in relation to persons 
of mixed blood . . . and I do not think it reasonable that such a doctrine should 
receive the least countenance. Such persons may have descended from Indians in 
both lines, or at least the maternal; they may have descended from a white parent in 
the maternal line or from mulatto parents originally free, in all which cases the 
offspring, following the condition of the mother, is entitled to freedom. Considering 
how many probabilities there are in favor of the liberty of these persons, they ought 
not to be deprived of it upon mere presumption.”).  
 176. Gregory v. Baugh, 2 Leigh 665, 683-86 (Va. 1831) (“No possible 
contrivance, short of reducing the whole race to absolute slavery, could be better 
calculated to obscure and confound their right to freedom, and to destroy the 
evidence of it . . . proof that a party is descended in the female line from an indian 
woman, and especially, a native american, without anything more, is prima facie 
proof of his right to freedom.”); Daniel v. Guy, 19 Ark. 121, 134 (1857) (“If it be 
doubtful [if the plaintiff is white or black], there is no basis for legal presumption, 
but it is safest to give him the benefit of the doubt.”).  
 177. Nichols v. Bell, 1 Jones N.C. 32, 32-34 (N.C. 1853) (“We know of no 
law or decision, which authorizes such a presumption [in favor of slavery] . . . If we 
had the power, we certainly have not the disposition to extend the principle further . 
. . Let the presumption rest upon the African color; that is a decided mark.”).  
 178. Fox, 3 Halsted at 277-78 (“A long fruition of all the rights and 
privileges of a freeman raises a violent presumption of freedom.”); Hunter v. 
Shaffer, 1 Dudl. Ga. 224, 226 (Ga. 1831) (“The fact that those persons have been 
considered free, and enjoyed their liberty and property for nearly a half a century in 
a neighboring State, that they have formed contracts of marriage with free white 
citizens, will require this Court to presume them free.”); Minchin v. Docker, 17 Fed. 
Cas. 437, 437 (D.C. App. 1806) (“Although color is prima facie evidence of slavery, 
yet the fact that the [person] had, for a long time, publicly acted as free, turned the 
presumption the other way.”); Burke v. Joe, 6 Gill & John. 136, 136-39 (Md. 1834); 
State v. Harden, 2 Spears 152, 152 n. (S.C. 1832) (“Proof that a negro has been 
suffered to live in a community for years, as a free man, would, prima facie, 
establish the fact of freedom.”). 
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law of nations, the burden of proof always lay on the claimant to 
show that he was entitled to hold the slave.179 Regardless of color, 
these states held that the presumption of freedom, guaranteed by the 
common law, applied to everyone. As one Delaware court put it:  
At the common law there was always a strong presumption in favor of 
freedom. In the first settlement of his country, the fact of the existence of 
the negro race in a state of bondage to the whites, and a large majority of 
that color being slaves, was considered sufficiently strong to outweigh the 
common law presumption, and to introduce a legal presumption that a 
colored person is prima facie a slave. Yet the state of things has changed; 
and cessante causa, cessat et ipsa lex. There are in this state about 20,000 
persons of color; of whom 17,000 are free, and 3,000 slaves. A large 
majority of all persons of color in the United States are free. In point of 
fact, therefore, there is no reason to presume slavery from color; in 
opposition to the strong common law presumption, that every man having 
the human form is a freeman.180 
Other courts refused to presume slavery without affirmative 
proof of title, even when the facts plausibly suggested slavery.181 
Illinois justified this presumption by invoking natural justice:  
With us the presumption is in favor of liberty; and the mere claim of the 
defendant to hold the plaintiff as a slave, and the fact of his having resided 
with the defendant during the time when the services were rendered, 
devolved no legal necessity on the plaintiff to prove his freedom . . . The 
rule, in some or most of the slaveholding States, from considerations of 
public policy, is undoubtedly that the onus probandi lies with the party 
asserting his freedom. This rule, however, is conceived and founded in 
injustice. It is contrary to one of the fundamental principles upon which 
our Government is founded: and is repugnant to natural right; nor can 
there be, in my judgment, sufficient grounds of public policy, to justify a 
                                                 
 179. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 Fed. Cas. 832, 847-49 (C.C. Mass. 1822) (Story, 
Circuit Justice) (adopting the holding of The Amedie) (“I am bound to consider the 
[slave] trade an offence against the universal law of society and in all cases where it 
is not protected by a foreign government. . . . The onus probandi rests on the 
claimants to establish the legitimate existence of the trade.”); see also Fales v. 
Mayberry, 8 Fed. Cas. 970, 971 (C.C. R.I. 1815). This holding was later reversed in 
the famous Marshall-era decision, The Antelope, 10 U.S. (Wheat) 66, 122 (1825) 
(holding that the slave trade can only be made piracy by positive law). Counsel for 
the slaves cited the Rule of Liberty in argument, but the Court ignored it. See id. at 
81, 107-08; DYER 62-65. 
 180. State v. Dillahunt, 3 Harrington 551, 551 (Del. 1840); State v. Griffin, 3 
Harrington 559, 559 (Del. 1841). 
 181. Butler v. Craig, 2 Har. & McH. 214, 214 (Md. 1791) (“[N]o 
presumption of such a conviction arises from the petitioner and her ancestors having 
always been held in slavery.”); Dighton v. Freetown, 4 Mass. 539, 540 (Mass. 
1808). 
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departure from the well-settled rules of evidence governing all other cases, 
and adopting one which inverts a rule drawn from natural justice.182 
As powerful as these presumptions were, they could not prove 
freedom.183 But for quite some time, the courts relaxed the rule 
against hearsay and the general bar on parol evidence in order to 
accommodate claims to freedom.184 While most cases justified these 
lenient rules based on necessity,185 one court pointed out that this 
evidence carried the same reliability guarantees as the traditional 
hearsay exceptions:186  
Freedom in this country is not a mere name . . . and it makes itself 
manifest by many public acts . . . transfers its possessor . . . from the 
kitchen and the cotton-field, to the court-house, and the election ground. . . 
. It is difficult to suppose a case, where common reputation would concede 
to a man the right to freedom, if his right were a groundless one.187 
But slowly, following the U.S. Supreme Court in Mima Queen 
v. Hepburn, courts began to overrule these cases and adopt a 
formalistic rule that demanded direct proof of the right to freedom.188 
                                                 
 182. Kinney v. Cook, 3 Scammon 232, 232-33 (Ill. 1840); Bailey v. 
Cromwell, 3 Scammon 71, 73 (Ill. 1841) ([T]he presumption of law was, in this 
State, that every person was free, without regard to color . . . . The girl being free, 
and asserting her freedom in the only modes she could, by doing as she pleased, 
making purchases, [and] contracting debts, could not be the subject of a sale.”); 
Hone v. Ammons, 14 Ill. 29, 29-30 (1852) (“The moment the defendant proved that 
the negro was on our soil, he established prima facie that he was free . . . the bare 
claim of title by Hone was no evidence” to rebut this presumption). 
 183. State v. Jeans, 4 Harrington 570, 571 (Del. 1845).  
 184. Jenkins v. Tom, 1 Wash. Va. 69, 123 (Va. 1792); Mahoney v. Ashton, 4 
Har. & McH. 63, 295-96, 306-09, 321 (Md. 1797); Shorter v. Boswell, 2 Har. & 
John. 359, 362 (Md. 1808); Davis v. Forrest, 7 Fed. Cas. 129, 129 (D.C. App. 1811); 
Geer v. Huntington, 2 Root 364, 364 (Conn. 1796); Dowrey v. Logan, 12 B. Mon. 
236, 236-39 (Ky. 1851); United States v. West, 28 Fed. Cas. 529, 529 (D.C. App. 
1836). The courts refused to show the same leniency to the master. Lucy v. Pumfrey, 
1 Addison 380, 380-81 (Pa. 1799) (refusing to permit a master to introduce hearsay 
evidence that his unregistered slave was known by a different name, which was on 
the registry, because that would “reduce that certainty of a registry to uncertainty. . . 
. Fraud and perjury would be let in, to make slaves of negroes really free. The fault 
lies with the master, and he must bear the consequences.”); Cato v. Howard, 2 Har. 
& John. 323, 323-24 (Md. 1808). 
 185. Gregory v. Baugh, 2 Leigh 665, 690-91 (Va. 1831). 
 186. Vaughan v. Phebe, 1 Mart. & Yerg. 5, 5-7 (Tenn. 1827); Miller v. 
Denman, 8 Yerger 233, 234-36 (Tenn. 1835) 
 187. Vaughan v. Phebe, 1 Mart. & Yerg. 5, 5-7 (Tenn. 1827). 
 188. See, e.g., Walkup v. Pratt, 5 Har. & John. 51, 56 (Md. 1820); Mima 
Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch 290, 295-97 (1813); Glover v. Millings, 2 Stew. & P. 
28, 30-32 (Ala. 1832); Abercrombie v. Abercrombie, 27 Ala. 489, 495 (1855). 
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The Virginia courts opined that “our judges, (from the purest of 
motives I am sure), did, in favorem libertatis, sometimes relax, rather 
too much, the rules of law, and particularly the rules of evidence.”189 
Justice Duvall dissented in Mima Queen, pointing out that hearsay 
was admissible to prove, for example, the ancient boundaries of land. 
He argued that hearsay must therefore be competent in freedom 
cases because “the right to freedom is more important than the right 
to property.”190 
The thrust of these cases was that formalism—while perhaps 
generally appealing—should not play a major role in freedom cases. 
Human freedom was too important to be smothered by the 
inequitable spillovers caused by formalism. Thus, the courts 
structured the rules in these cases to guard against wrongful 
enslavement, even if those structures permitted some fraud or 
abuse.191 Indeed, this structural advantage forms the very basis of 
both Lenity and Liberty.192   
C. Interpretation 
The final set of cases where the Rule of Liberty appeared was 
in the interpretation of legal documents. It appeared in the mundane 
probate case, the high-profile constitutional law decision, and 
everything in-between. Like in the previous two Sections, the courts 
applied the rule liberally until the South eradicated it. 
                                                 
 189. Gregory, 2 Leigh at 680 (Opinion of Carr, J.).  
 190. Mima Queen, 7 Cranch at 298 (Duvall, J., dissenting).  
 191. This is not an unfamiliar tactic. Cf. Phila. Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 
U.S. 767, 778 (1986) (“We recognize that requiring the plaintiff to show falsity will 
insulate from liability some speech that is false, but unprovably so . . . . [But] ‘[t]he 
First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech 
that matters.’”). 
 192. III BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, 88-89 n.30 (“[F]or whenever any 
ambiguity arises in a statute introducing a new penalty or punishment, the decision 
shall be on the side of lenity and mercy; or in favour of natural right and liberty; or, 
in other words, the decision shall be according to the strict letter in favour of the 
subject. . . . And it is more consonant to principles of liberty that the judge should 
acquit whom the legislator intended to punish, than that he should punish whom the 
legislator intended to discharge with impunity.”) Had England needed to deal with 
institutional slavery, Blackstone could have easily continued his analogy: “And it is 
more consonant to principles of liberty that the judge should free him whom the law 
makes a slave, than that he should enslave him whom the law declares to be free.”   
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1. Private Law: Wills, Deeds, and Contracts  
If [a] construction is doubtful, some weight is due to the maxim that every 
deed is to be taken most strongly against the grantor, and to the spirit of 
the Laws of all civilized nations which favours liberty. 
Virginia Supreme Court, Isaac v. West (1828) 
In private-law cases, the Rule of Liberty operated as a super-
strong contra perfornem rule. Courts generally construed ambiguities 
against the drafter of an instrument. But added to that rule was the 
fact that the right in question was freedom, and courts generally 
required clarity or contravening state policy before they would 
frustrate a grant of freedom.  
Isaac v. West was followed in most states.193 The courts 
routinely interpreted private legal documents to favor freedom by 
permitting the humane treatment of slaves,194 by implying grants of 
freedom,195 by construing conditions precedent to freedom 
narrowly,196 by creating default rules favoring emancipation197 and by 
                                                 
 193. See, e.g., Elder v. Elder, 4 Leigh 252, 260 (Va. 1833); Cromartie v. 
Robison, 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 218, 221 (N.C. 1855); Concklin v. Havens, 12 
Johnson 314, 314-15 (N.Y. 1815). 
 194. McLeish v. Burch, 3 Strob. Eq. 255, 255 (S.C. 1849) (holding that a 
direction to the administratrix that she should only make slaves work as much as 
necessary to pay taxes would not be set aside at the behest of the next-of-kin); Ford 
v. Porter, 11 Rich. Eq. 238, 239-54 (S.C. 1860) (affirming a testator’s instruction to 
treat slaves as humanely as the law will allow.). 
 195. Hall v. Mullin, 5 Har. & John. 190, 192-95 (Md. 1821) (holding that 
when someone devises property to a slave, he frees them “by implication, or by the 
true construction of his will, taking all its parts together. . . . under those parts of the 
will by which property was given to her . . . her freedom by implication, is 
indispensably necessary to give efficacy to those clauses of the will.”); Davis v. 
Wood, 17 B. Mon. 86, 92-94, 100 (Ky. 1856) (holding that the use of “negro” in a 
will, instead of “slave” should be interpreted to give an immediate right to freedom, 
not a future right to freedom). But see, e.g., Bell v. McCormick, 3 Fed. Cas. 107, 
108 (D.C. App. 1838) (holding that there is no implied emancipation when the 
master conveys a legacy to a slave but also directs him to be sold). 
 196. Jacob v. Sharp, 1 Meigs 114, 114-18 (Tenn 1838); Pleasants v. 
Pleasants, 2 Call. 353 (Va.) (construing ambiguity to mean a present right to future 
freedom, not a mere promise of future freedom); Erskine v. Henry, 9 Leigh 188, 
189-90 (Va. 1838); Graham v. Sam, 7 B. Mon. 403, 405 (Ky. 1847) (following the 
same principle, not just “in view of the clearly presumed intention of the testator, but 
in obedience to the dictates of humanity.”); Snow v. Callum, 1 Dessaussure 542, 543 
(S.C. 1797) (holding that the words “and her increase” mandated that the children of 
a slave were free when born while their mother was awaiting freedom). 
 197. Caffey v. Davis, 1 Jones Eq. 1, 5 (N.C. 1853) (holding that a testator 
need not expressly state that the children of slaves, born before freedom accrued, 
follow the parents into freedom: “Had [slave parents] at the termination of the life 
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applying cy pres when the grant (as written) would be illegal.198 Even 
after slavery was abolished, some courts continued to interpret these 
documents liberally, in order to give full effect to freedom—some on 
the grounds that strict construction would be “contrary to the policy 
of the United States.”199  
One Massachusetts court explained the rationale for enforcing 
the Rule of Liberty after abolition. A testator devised a substantial 
fortune with the goal of persuading the public to abolish slavery.200 
After the Amendment intervened, the Court sustained the trust:   
The law of Massachusetts has always been peculiarly favorable to freedom 
. . . The Constitution of the United States uniformly speaks of those held 
in slavery, not as property, but as persons; and never contained anything 
inconsistent with their peaceable and voluntary emancipation . . . The 
bequest itself manifests its immediate purpose to be to educate the whole 
people upon the sin of a man’s holding his fellow-man in bondage . . . . 
The charitable bequests . . . cannot, in the opinion of the court, be regarded 
as so restricted in their objects, or so limited in point of time, as to have 
terminated and been destroyed by the abolition in the United States . . . 
Neither the immediate purpose of the testator—nor his ultimate object—
has been fully accomplished by the abolition of slavery.201 
Following the historical pattern, however, some states 
repudiated this thinking. They overruled the cases holding that a 
devise of property implied a grant of emancipation.202  They required 
surgical precision from masters before they would enforce any right 
to freedom,203 subordinated freedom to other property rights,204 and 
                                                                                                       
estate, been unable to comply with the condition [entitling them to freedom], their 
issue . . . would have gone with them into servitude to the remainderman . . . Why 
any more necessity that the testator should mention [the] issue [in the will] . . . to 
give liberty to such increase, than to doom it to slavery?”) 
 198. Boon v. Lancaster, 1 Sneed 577, 580, 585-86 (Tenn. 1854). 
 199. Cowan v. Stamps, 46 Miss. 435, 440-42, 447-49 (1872) (“To require 
these people to remove . . . would seem an unnecessary hardship, and . . . it would 
be against a wise public policy to impose a condition of emigration in order to 
accept a bequest, not imposed by a testator, but by a prior law since abrogated . . . 
removal . . .was not a condition precedent in the mind of the donor, but a mode of 
giving freedom, a pre-requisite, imposed by law.”). This hearkens back to the pre-
crisis theory of emancipation laws as police regulations, not as broad statements of 
policy. See also, e.g., Haley v. Haley, 1 Phil. Eq. 180, 181-86 (N.C. 1867) (ignoring 
the condition because it would be contrary to the policy of the United States).  
 200. Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539, 541, 545 (Mass. 1867).  
 201. Id. at 539-45, 550-70, 594-95. 
 202. Atkins v. Kron, 2 Ired. Eq. 8, 60, 66 (N.C. 1841); Kirkpatrick v. Rogers, 
6 Ired. Eq. 130, 130-36 (N.C. 1848). 
 203. See, e.g., Taylor v. Am. Bible Soc’y, 7 Ired. Eq. 201, 201, 206 (N.C. 
1851) (voiding a grant of freedom when a mistress said “if I could in any way effect 
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declared that applying cy pres to grants of freedom would be 
“monstrous.”205 The theme of these cases was the primacy of state 
laws favoring slavery and the newfound inherent inferiority of the 
African-American.206 
Cases interpreting deeds and contracts are more sparse. But the 
general rule seemed to mirror Isaac v. West, at least in Virginia: 
“[U]nless the opinion pronouncing the construction . . . be clear and 
disembarrassed of all reasonable doubt, the law entitles the [slave] to 
the benefit of the doubt, and the most favorable construction upon 
the deed.”207 Kentucky also refused to require exacting clarity.208 
During the brief period where North Carolina favored freedom, the 
courts enforced a grant of freedom to a child even though it failed to 
mention meritorious services—a legal requirement—and even 
though the child was too young to have met the requirement.209 Other 
courts refused to allow a subsequent sale to void a grant of  freedom, 
even when the purchaser was ignorant of the grant.210 For these 
                                                                                                       
it, I would emancipate [my slaves]. I do not wish to entail slavery upon them,” 
because she “nowhere leaves them their freedom.”); Curry v. Curry, 30 Ga. 253, 
257-62 (1860) (holding that a slave could not choose between freedom and slavery, 
and then holding that the emancipation clause was not severable because the court 
was not sure what the master would have done if he knew the slave had no power of 
choice); Maria v. Surbaugh, 2 Randolph 228, 238-41 (Va. 1824) (without an express 
statement that children born during the life estate are free, they must be enslaved); 
Johnson  v. Johnson, 8 B. Mon. 470 , 471-74 (Ky. 1848); Ellis v. Jenny, 2 Rob. Va. 
597, 597-99 (Va. 1844). 
 204. Drury v. Grace, 2 Har. & John. 356, 356-59 (Md. 1808). 
 205. Am. Colonization Soc’y v. Bass, 18 Ga. 127, 127-29, 136-38 (1855) 
(“The monstrous doctrine of cy pres is not to have given it one inch of ground . . . 
The bequests of the will as to the negroes cannot be executed under the ‘cy pres’ 
doctrine without manifesting . . . any general intent to manumit . . .”). 
 206. E.g., Cromartie v. Robison, 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 218, 221 (N.C. 1855) 
(“We think proper also to say, in putting a construction upon the will now before us, 
we have a single eye to the intention of the testator, without reference to the notion 
that Courts should favor charities, and lean in favorem libertatis; for, however 
humane we may suppose the feeling that prompts, it is not established that public 
policy favors the emancipation of our slaves; and although the principles of the 
common law look with favor upon the transition of a bondsman, or villain, to the 
state and condition of a free white man, yet very different conclusions may be 
involved, when the question is between the condition of a slave and that of a free 
negro.”). 
 207. Logan v. Commonwealth, 2 Grattan 571, 572-74 (Va. 1845). 
 208. See, e.g., Fanny v. Bryant, 4 J.J. Marsh. 368, 369 (Ky. 1830) (holding 
that a deed freeing a woman “and her increase” on a certain date in the future 
granted a present right to future freedom).  
 209. Sampson v. Burgwin, 3 Dev. & Bat. 28, 28-32 (N.C. 1838).  
 210. See, e.g., Isaac v. Farnsworth, 3 Head 275, 276-79 (Tenn. 1859). 
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judges, “The manumission does not [merely] rest upon the principles 
of a contract, . . . but it is an act of benevolence, sanctioned by the 
statute, and made obligatory, if in writing.”211 The contrary cases 
followed the same pattern—masters must confer freedom and rights 
clearly, and the fundamental law of the land favored slavery.212 
2. Public Law: Legislation  
[G]overnors might be presumed to be disposed to do much to conciliate 
the rich and powerful at the expense of the weak and defenseless . . . All 
men are by the law of nature free: And without some positive declaration 
of the sovereign power of the State to the contrary, all judicial opinions, in 
my opinion should set at liberty every individual who sues for his 
freedom. 
Missouri Supreme Court, Marguerite v. Choteau (1828)213 
The issue of slavery was often subject to legislation. The most 
common kinds were statutes abolishing slavery, statutes banning the 
importation of slaves, and the federal Fugitive Slave Act. But the 
Rule of Liberty also appeared in cases interpreting criminal statutes, 
in questions involving retroactivity and implied repeals, to resolve 
ambiguity, and (most importantly) to interpret the Northwest 
Ordinance.  
As a general rule, courts interpreted statutes abolishing slavery 
in favor of the slave. Pennsylvania’s gradual-abolition statute—
which imposed meticulous registration requirements—provides the 
most useful example.214 When the construction of this statute was in 
                                                 
 211. Ketletas v. Fleet, 7 Johnson 324, 325-26, 330-31 (N.Y. 1811).  
 212. Allen v. Peden, 2 Car. L.R. 638, 638 (N.C. 1816) (striking down a 
legislative act freeing slaves because such an act was “plainly in violation of the 
fundamental law of the land.”); Mayho v. Sears, 3 Iredell 224, 224-25, 232 (N.C. 
1842) (interpreting neutral language in a deed to enslave children even though their 
mother would be free); Franklin v. Waters, 8 Gill 322, 323-24, 327-28 (Md. 1849) 
(holding that an obligation for a master to pay wages to a freed slave must be stated 
clearly); Jason v. Henderson, 7 Md. 430, 441 (1855) (holding that a free person of 
color could not sue a person unlawfully holding him in servitude). 
 213. Marguerite v. Choteau, 2 Mo. 71, 90 (1828) (Opinion of Tompkins, J.); 
Errata, 2 Mo. 241. One judge was absent, and, the other judge dissenting, the court 
affirmed the decision below in favor of the master. Marguerite, 2 Mo. at 93. This 
decision was later overruled and decided in conformity with Judge Tompkins’ view 
of the law. Marguerite v. Choteau, 3 Mo. 540, 571 (1834). The U.S. Supreme Court 
denied review for want of a substantial federal question. Choteau v. Marguerite, 12 
U.S. (Pet.) 507, 509 (1838).  
 214. See 4 HELEN T. CATTERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN 
SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 243-54 (1936); FINKELMAN, supra note 28, at 52-59 
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doubt, the Pennsylvania courts generally construed it against the 
master.215 The courts justified this on considerations of humanity, the 
purpose of the statute,216 and laches by the owner, who had the ability 
to be careful.217 Even the most trivial of oversights sometimes caused 
the master to lose his slave.218  
Connecticut’s treatment of its importation statutes was similar.  
These statutes, among other things, freed all slaves “left” in the state, 
with an exception for travelers. Citing Somerset, the court interpreted 
the word “left” as imposing forfeiture even without proof of intent to 
leave slaves in the state: “Is it true, that if a person does not intend to 
do an act, and yet does it, that the act is done? . . . This slave has 
been brought and left in this state, contrary to [law]; and therefore, . . 
. she cannot be claimed or treated as a slave, under our laws.”219 
The courts also used their equitable powers to expand the scope 
of statutes to assist slaves. Early cases in Virginia invoked 
“principles of humanity” to expand the scope of a law prohibiting the 
mistreatment of indentured servants.220 New York refused to eject a 
slave from land he received for serving in the revolutionary war, 
reasoning that by giving him the land, the legislature impliedly 
removed the relevant slave-code disabilities.221  
In other cases, early courts interpreted ambiguous words in a 
statute to favor freedom.222 When later-enacted statues were 
                                                 
 215. Id.; see, e.g., Respublica v. Betsey, 1 Dallas 469, 472, 474-78 (Pa. 
1789) (Opinions of Atlee, J., and Rush, J.); Commonwealth v. Barker, 11 S. & R. 
360, 361 (Pa. 1824).  
 216. Betsey, 1 Dallas at 472, 474-78 (Opinions of Atlee, J., and Rush, J.). 
 217. Id. at 472, 478-79 (Opinion of Bryan, J.).  
 218. Barker, 11 S. & R. at 361 (holding that the failure of a master to 
indicate his occupation on the slave register, as required by statute, was grounds for 
forfeiture). But see Wilson v. Belinda, 3 S. & R. 396, 398 (Pa. 1817) (“[W]here 
there appears to have been an intent to comply honestly . . . the construction should 
be liberal in favor of the master.”); Marchand v. Peggy, 2 S. & R. 18, 18-19 (Pa. 
1815) (holding that the rule did not apply to the threshold issue of territorial 
jurisdiction). 
 219. Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, 39-40, 45-52 (1837). The dissenting 
judge, engaging in some excellent textual analysis, pointed out that this stretched the 
text farther than was reasonable. Id. at 55-66 (Bissell, J., dissenting).  
 220. Gwinn v. Bugg, 1 Jefferson 87, 87-89 (Va. 1769). 
 221. New York ex rel. Jackson v. Lervey, 5 Cowen 397, 397, 400-404 (N.Y. 
1826) (“[T]he disabilities of the patentee and the heir, arising from a state of slavery, 
are removed by the acts authorizing the grant. . . . the legislature intended to remove 
the disabilities incident to slavery.”). 
 222. Butt v. Rachel, 4 Munford 209, 209-13 (Va. 1814); Reno v. Davis, 4 
Hen & M. 283, 285 (Va. 1809) (“[I]n a case of doubt, the law of humanity ought to 
turn the scale.”); Ex parte Ferrett, 1 Mill 194, 195 (S.C. 1817) (holding that the word 
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inconsistent with earlier laws favoring slavery, the courts freely held 
that the slave laws were impliedly repealed.223 But until the courts 
began deconstructing the Rule of Liberty, they rigorously enforced 
the presumptions in the opposite situation—when a newer law or 
sentiment favored slavery.224 
Lenity and Liberty called for courts to exercise their discretion 
“whenever possible in favorem libertatis, and for the amelioration or 
avoidance of human suffering.”225 But in criminal law, these 
principles pointed to opposite results. In prosecutions involving 
slavery and freedom, the Rule of Lenity required affirmative proof of 
both mens rea226 and most necessary attendant circumstances.227  
But this was not a universal rule. Lenity did not apply when the 
defendant attempted to escape an involuntary-servitude indictment 
by arguing that the statute was being extended to new circumstances 
not specifically intended by Congress.228 Congress passed peonage 
statutes specifically to address debt bondage in New Mexico, but the 
U.S. Attorney in Georgia used it to charge two defendants who were 
holding African-Americans in servitude.229 The defendants argued (a 
lá Holy Trinity) that although their conduct might be within the letter 
of the statute, “[I]t is not within the statute, because not within the 
                                                                                                       
“Indian” would not be expanded to enslave Asian Indians); State v. Belmont, 4 
Strobhart 445, 454-57 (S.C. 1850) (“I am for adhering to the decision . . . that spares 
the race of Shem.”) 
 223. Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jefferson 109, 116, 122 (Va. 1772); Hannah v. 
Davis, 2 Tucker 47, 139 (Va. App. 1787); Hudgins v. Wrights, 1 Hen & M. 134, 
137-38 (Va. 1806); Jenkins v. Tom, 1 Wash Va. 69, 123 (Va. 1792).  
 224. State v. Taylor, 2 McCord 483, 483-85, 492 (S.C. 1823); Campbell v. 
Campbell, 13 Ark. 513, 521-22 (1853) (“The act [limiting the number of free blacks 
in the state] was . . . but a measure of self-defence . . . we will tolerate the evils 
resulting from the emancipation of our own slaves, until the sense of the people may 
require an avowed change in policy.”); Redd v. Hargrove, 40 Ga. 18, 24 (1869). But 
see Mordecai v. Boylan, 6 Jones Eq. 365, 365-68 (N.C. 1863) (applying a law 
retroactively to defeat an emancipation). 
 225. United States v. Fah Chung, 132 F. 109, 112-13 (S.D. Ga. 1904) 
 226. Birney v. State, 8 Ohio 230, 238 (1837) (“We know of no case where . . 
. action is held criminal, unless the intention accompanies the act. . . . It cannot be 
assumed that an act which . . . involves no moral wrong . . . should be made 
criminal, when performed in total unconsciousness of the facts that infect it with 
crime.”). 
 227. United States v. Darnaud, 25 Fed. Cas. 754, 760-61 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 
1855) (“The slave trade, however horrible it may be, is not [Piracy] . . . [T]he 
element, therefore, of citizenship [of the United States], is an essential condition of 
the crime.”).  
 228. United States v. McClellan, 127 F. 971, 972-79 (S.D. Ga. 1904) 
 229. Id.  
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spirit of the law.”230 They also cited Lord Coke on the Rule of Lenity, 
where he says: “Acts of Parliament are to be so construed as no man 
that is innocent or free from injury or wrong be, by a literal 
construction, punished or endangered.”231 
The court impaled the defendants on this last argument. The 
judge admitted that it was probably true that Congress was targeting 
New Mexican peonage. But invoking Lenity in this case was barred 
by the Thirteenth Amendment:   
[How] can it be contended that the conduct of the prisoners, as described 
in this indictment, as innocent or free from injury or wrong? Is it not 
inimical to the amendment of the Constitution which defines involuntary 
servitude? Is it not involuntary servitude to seize by force, to hurry the 
victim from wife and children, to incarcerate him in a stockade, and work 
him in range of the deadly muzzle of the shotgun, or under the terror of the 
lash, and continue this servitude as long as resentment may prompt, or 
greed demand? It is true that a literal construction will not be favored, if 
the object be to punish those who are innocent, or free from injury or 
wrong. This was the decision of the Supreme Court in [Holy Trinity] . . . 
There the statute was construed in favor of liberty. . . But what parallel is 
there between the holy ministrations of the man of God, though 
serviceable and laborious, and the conduct of lawless and violent men who 
would seize helpless and pathetic negroes, and for their own selfish 
purposes consign them to a life of involuntary servitude, compared to 
which the slavery of the antebellum days was a paradise. And it otherwise 
appears that the construction of this act which seems to us proper is in 
salutary accord not only with the spirit of Congress in adopting it but with 
other statutes for the same general purpose, which portray unmistakably 
the consistent purpose to stamp out on American soil any and every form 
of involuntary servitude. . . . This is another instance of the exercise by 
Congress of the power granted by the thirteenth amendment to prevent 
involuntary servitude.”232  
Essentially, such a barefaced attempt to recreate slavery—a crime 
malum in se, if there ever was one—was constitutionally ineligible 
for Lenity.   
Finally, the Rule of Liberty also appeared in interpretations of 
the Northwest Ordinance, which said that “there shall be neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory.”233 Until 1856, 
courts uniformly agreed that the Ordinance was constitutional.234 
                                                 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. United States v. McClellan, 127 F. 971, 976-77 (S.D. Ga. 1904). 
 233. The Northwest Ordinance, Act of July 13, 1787, art. 6, 1 Stat. 50. 
 234. Winny v. Whitesides, 1 Mo. 472, 474-76 (1824) (“We did not suppose 
that any person could mistake the policy of Congress, in making this provision. . . . 
Sound national policy required, that the evil should be restricted, as much as 
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These courts, particularly the courts in Missouri, imposed near-strict 
liability on masters who brought their slaves into the Territory. 
According to these courts, the ordinance was a “fundamental 
law, for those who choose to live under it.”235 Thus, if the master 
stayed in Missouri for any longer than necessary, his slaves became 
free.236 And when it was doubtful whether the Ordinance operated to 
free a slave, the courts erred in favor of liberty:  
I remark, however, that if the plaintiff’s freedom was at all doubtful under 
the Ordinance . . . the court would, in favor of liberty, infer that he was 
born since the adoption of the Constitution, in a case where the evidence 
leaves the fact doubtful . . . But I should never feel warranted in resorting 
to such a construction, to deprive a human being of his liberty, or deny 
him the rights of humanity. The presumption is in favor of liberty . . . if I 
entertained a doubt I should be compelled to decide in favor of liberty.237 
The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review any of these cases until 
Dred Scott, citing either the lack of a substantial federal question238 
or holding that the Ordinance was properly construed.239 
3. Constitutional Law 
Admitting it was a doubtful point, whether the constitution was to be 
considered prospective in its operation or not, the [masters] say, you take 
from us a vested right arising from municipal law. The [slaves] say you 
would deprive us of a natural right guaranteed by the ordinance and the 
constitution. How should the Court decide, if construction was really to 
determine it? I presume it would be in favour of liberty. 
                                                                                                       
possible. What they could, they did. [The People] said, by their representatives, it 
shall not vest within these limits, and by their acts for nearly half a century, they 
have approved and sanctioned this declaration.”); Merry v. Tiffin, 1 Mo. 725, 725 
(Mo. 1827) (“The ordinance is positive, that slavery cannot exist; and . . . we, or any 
other court, [cannot] say otherwise.”). But see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393, 432-53 (1856). 
 235. La Grange v. Chouteau, 2 Mo. 20, 22 (Mo. 1828), writ denied, 
Lagrange v. Choteau, 4 U.S. 287, 290 (1830). 
 236. Julia v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 270, 272-75 (1833) (holding that convenience 
is not an excuse for delay); Rachel v. Walker, 4 Mo. 350, 352-54 (1836); La 
Grange, 2 Mo. at 22. (“[A]ny sort of residence contrived or permitted by the legal 
owner, upon the faith of secret trusts or contracts, in order to defeat or evade the 
ordinance . . . would doubtless entitle a slave to freedom.”); Ralph v. Duncan, 3 Mo. 
194, 195-96 (1833) (temporarily hiring out a slave to someone in Missouri resulted 
in the slave being free). 
 237. Jarrot v. Joseph, 2 Gilman 1, 6-11, 23-30 (Ill. 1845). 
 238. Menard v. Aspasia, 5 U.S. (Pet.) 505, 517 (1831) (Opinion of McLean, 
J.) (“The title of [the master] does not arise under an act of congress.”). 
 239. Lagrange, 4 U.S. at 290 (Opinion of Marshall, C.J.). 
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Mississippi Supreme Court, Harry v. Decker & Hopkins (1818)240 
The most significant applications of the Rule of Liberty were in 
constitutional law. It is common knowledge that the Constitution 
would not exist had the North and South not compromised about 
slavery.241 This compromise resulted in the Fugitive Slave Clause, 
which forced courts to arbitrate disputes between northern and 
southern citizens.  
These disputes gave birth to American conflicts-of-law rules. 
In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the first major conflicts case before the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the question was Congress’s power to enact the 
fugitive slave laws and northern states’ ability to free slaves within 
their borders.242 Justice Story began with Somerset:  
By the general law of nations, no nation is bound to recognize the state of 
slavery, as to foreign slaves found within its territorial dominions, when it 
is in opposition to its own policy and institutions, in favor of the subjects 
of other nations where slavery is recognized . . . This was fully recognized 
in [Somerset].243 
Although the entire Court agreed that slavery must be supported by 
positive law, Justice Story found one: The Fugitive Slave Clause.244 
The Clause “manifestly contemplate[d] the existence of a positive, 
unqualified right on the part of the owner of the slave, which no state 
law . . . can in any way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain.”245 
But this was the extent of the Clause’s reach, as far as Northern 
courts were concerned. With the exception of a few cases urging 
comity for the sake of preserving the Union,246 northern courts 
refused to recognize slavery except as declared by express federal 
law.247 Their position was, essentially, that while the Constitution 
                                                 
 240. Harry v. Decker & Hopkins, 1 Walk. Miss. 36, 42 (Miss. 1818). This 
case is representative of the opinions of the courts in (at least) Missouri, Tennessee, 
Maryland, and Virginia at the start of the nineteenth century. FINKELMAN 169-70.  
 241. Commonwealth v. Holloway, 2 S. & R. 305, 307-08 (Pa. 1816) (The 
[Founders] had the whole subject of slavery before them, . . . it was no easy task to 
reconcile the discordant prepossessions . . . but the business was accomplished by 
acts of concession and mutual condescension.”). 
 242. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 U.S. (Pet.) 539, 611-12 (1842). 
 243. Id.  
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. E.g., Willard v. People, 4 Scammon 461, 470-72 (Ill. 1843). 
 247. White v. White, 3 Head 404, 406-11 (Tenn. 1859) (enforcing an 
emancipation in a will even though the testator died in Mississippi and the 
Mississippi courts voided the emancipation); Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 601-
02, 610, 615 (N.Y. 1860) (“Every sovereign State has a right to determine by its 
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acted as a sort of “treaty”248 mandating the recognition of the right to 
recapture fugitive slaves, it could not be extended by equity to any 
other case.249 Therefore, the common-law Rule of Liberty—including 
the irrevocability principle—was binding.250 
                                                                                                       
laws the condition of all persons who may at any time be within its jurisdiction . . . 
[the master] has no more right to the protection of this property than one of the 
citizens of this state would have upon bringing them here under the same 
circumstances, and . . . the [fugitive slave] clause of the Constitution . . . has no 
application to this case.”); Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, 39-43, 45, 52-54 (1837) 
(declaring that slavery was “a system of such a character, that it can claim nothing 
by the law of comity, which prevails among friendly states upon subjects of a 
different class . . . it [is] local, and must be governed entirely by the laws of the 
state, in which it is attempted to be enforced.”); Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 
Pickering 193, 211, 217-18 (Mass. 1836) (holding that slavery, being “contrary to 
natural right, and effected by the local law, is dependent upon such local law for its 
existence and efficacy, and being contrary to the fundamental laws of this State, 
such general right of property cannot be exercised or recognized here.”); Selectmen 
v. Jacob, 2 Tyler 192, 199 (Vt. 1802) (“No inhabitant of the State can hold a slave; 
and though the bill of sale may be binding by the lex loci of another State or 
dominion, yet when the master becomes an inhabitant of this State, his bill of sale 
ceases to operate here.”); Jack v. Martin, 14 Wendell 507, 528 (N.Y. 1835). 
 248. In re Sims, 7 Cushing 285, 297-98 (Mass. 1851) (“But the right, thus 
secured by the constitution to the slave owner, is limited by it, and cannot be 
extended, by implication or construction, a line beyond the precise casus foederis. 
The fugitive must not only owe service or labor in another state, but he must have 
escaped from it.”). In other words, it cannot be extended beyond the object in the 
mind of the people who framed the law. Cf. III BLACKSTONE 88-89. 
 249. In re Sims, 7 Cushing at 297-98; Rodney v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 19 
Ill. 42, 44-45 (1857); Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 622, 626-31 (1856) 
(Opinion of Bowen, J.) (“Slavery is entirely local . . . and is repugnant to reason and 
natural law. . . . In this state not only are our institutions opposed to slavery but the 
Ordinance . . . prohibits its introduction here for any purpose. . . . Strengthened by 
the clearest principles of natural law, and by the decisions of courts of high character 
. . . [the slave] coming into this state by the consent of the master, obtained the 
freedom of which he had been deprived by local municipal legislation. His servitude 
ceased, and there is no law which can bring into operation the right of slavery once 
destroyed.”); see id. at 634-38 (Opinion of Brinkerhoff, J.) (“The absolute freedom 
of all persons at birth is a fundamental principle . . . This principle was, by the 
ordinance of 1787, impressed on the soil of Ohio . . . the moment any person comes 
within . . . Ohio, his personal rights are determined by the laws of Ohio [except in 
cases of fugitive slaves]. . . . The enslavement of a man once free, presents the 
monstrosity of a legalized wrong; The policy of Ohio is to maintain the rights of 
men.”); id. at 639-48, 671 (Opinion of Swan & Scott, JJ.) (“Whatever construction 
may be given by the Supreme Court of the United States to the constitutional 
provision relating to fugitives, whereby the laws of a free state are rendered 
inoperative, it is limited to cases coming within that provision.”); Commonwealth v. 
Holloway, 2 S. & R. 305, 307-08 (Pa. 1816) (holding that a child in utero at the time 
his mother escaped was not a fugitive within the Clause). 
 250. See supra notes 247-249; supra Subsection II.A.2. 
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Southern cases displayed the same state-centric ideas. Except 
for a few cases respecting freedom given by northern law,251 southern 
courts rejected northern judgments freeing a slave.252 The default rule 
in the South was that even a small showing that slavery was tolerated 
in another State was sufficient to require the courts to protect the 
rights of the master.253 Eventually, the southern courts expanded the 
Fugitive Slave Clause by equity, interpreting it as a promise that 
their slaves would be protected under all circumstances:  
Mississippi came into the union . . . with this institution, . . . protected . . . 
by the express provisions of [the Federal] Constitution. . . . Ohio . . . 
chooses to take to her embrace, as citizens, the neglected race, . . . 
regarded, at the formation of our government as an inferior caste. . . . Ohio 
can never confer freedom on a Mississippi slave, nor the right to acquire, 
hold, sue for, nor enjoy property in Mississippi.”254 
This sentiment also translated into broad constructions of the Clause 
and its enforcing statutes, on the federalist reasoning that the Clause 
placed the slave power under federal protection.255 
Tangential to the conflicts question was how states, as 
independent sovereigns, would interpret their own Constitutions. The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, citing the Rule of Liberty, 
held that a constitutional provision saying that all men were born 
“free and equal” impliedly abolished slavery.256 Although slavery had 
                                                 
 251. E.g., Harry v. Decker & Hopkins, 1 Walk. Miss. 36, 42 (Miss. 1818). 
 252. Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 583-86 (1852); Lewis v. Fullerton, 1 
Randolph 15, 15-24 (Va. 1821); Maria v. Kirby, 12 B. Mon. 542, 546, 551 (Ky. 
1852); Mahorner v. Hooe, 9 S. & M. 247, 272, 278 (Miss. 1848). 
 253. See, e.g., Charlotte v. Choteau, 11 Mo. 193, 199-200 (1847). 
 254. Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 243-45, 252-56, 263-64.  
 255. See Ex parte Hill, 38 Ala. 429, 436-37, 450, 456 (1863) (Opinion of 
Walker, C.J.) (“The fugitive-slave law was passed to protect . . . a clear 
constitutional right of a class of citizens in the United States. . . . In many of the 
states, the execution of the law was prevented; The powers of the Confederate 
government are given to it for the benefit . . . of all the people in all the states; and 
the historic lesson teaches us that the execution of the laws, passed by virtue of those 
powers, can not be safely left to the control of local tribunals.”); Fugitive Slave Law 
Cases, 30 Fed. Cas. 1007, 1009 (C.C. N.Y. 1851) (stating that the fugitive slave act 
is “designed, first, to substitute officers of the federal government in the place of 
the[] state magistrates; and second, to arm the officers with sufficient power and 
authority to enable them to execute the law against any resistance actual or 
threatened, and in whatever form it may be presented.”).  
 256. Commonwealth v. Jennison, 1 Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc. 1873-75, 293, 294 
(Mass. 1783) (Opinion of Cushing, C.J.). But see State v. Post, 1 Spencer 368, 369-
72, 377-78 (N.J. 1845) (holding the opposite on the same language). The Rule of 
Liberty also appeared in the arguments of some advocates, even if it was ultimately 
rejected. See, e.g., Ex parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77, 116-18 (1859) (argument of 
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previously been permitted, “nowhere is it expressly enacted,” and “a 
different idea has taken place with the people of America, more 
favorable to the natural rights of mankind, and to that natural, innate 
desire of Liberty . . . without regard to color [or] complexion.”257 
This idea, and the declaration that all men were born free, were:  
[T]otally repugnant to the idea of being born slaves . . . the idea of slavery 
is inconsistent with our own conduct and Constitution; and there can be no 
such thing as perpetual servitude of a rational creature, unless his liberty is 
forfeited by some criminal conduct or given up by personal consent or 
contract.258 
This view of the law was explicitly based on the logic of Somerset.259 
Once Constitutions began to abolish slavery and grant new 
protections to civil rights, the courts were confronted with new 
interpretive issues. In Ohio, the Constitution guaranteed all “free 
white citizens” the right to vote. But there was no bright line between 
black and white persons—and so the Ohio courts held that anyone 
nearer white than black was protected.260 The Ohio courts reaffirmed 
this principle in the wake of Dred Scott, snidely repudiating the 
Court’s holding that African-Americans could not be citizens:  
We do not think [authority] can be found which will countenance the idea 
that any the least admixture of African blood will preclude a person from 
being considered a citizen of the United States . . . . it seems too clear an 
argument that, had the phrase “citizen of the United States” [meant purely 
white], the word white would have been applied.261 
                                                                                                       
counsel) (“[S]lavery is so odious a nature, that the power to recognize its existence 
can be derived only from an affirmative grant . . . that honored maxim . . . requires 
every doubtful phrase to be construed in favor of liberty . . . In all the constitution, 
the word slave . . . is not there . . . vainly do you read the whole instrument in search 
of any express grant.”); The Antelope, 10 U.S. (Wheat) 66, 81, 107-08 (1825) 
(argument of counsel); DYER 62-65. 
 257. Id.  
 258. Jennison, 1 Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc. at 294 (Opinion of Cushing, C.J.). 
 259. Id.; Winchendon v. Hatfield, 4 Mass. 123, 125, 127-28 (1808); 
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1 Thach. Cr. Cas. 488, 496-97 (Mass. 1827) (holding 
that a person, “[H]aving been brought into this state by her master, cease[s] to be a 
slave . . . it being established law, that the moment that the master carries his slave 
into a country where domestic slavery is not permitted, he becomes free.”); 
Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 Pickering 193, 208-09 (Mass. 1836). 
 260. Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio 372, 374-75 (1842); Thacker v. Hawk, 11 
Ohio 376, 376-79 (1842) (rejecting the one-drop rule). This rule was later applied to 
void statutes prohibiting schools from accepting “colored” students. Lane v. Baker, 
12 Ohio 237, 238-39, 252 (1843).  
 261. Anderson v. Miliken, 9 Ohio St. 568, 576-80 (1859).  
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These interpretations laid the groundwork for the court to invalidate 
a law permitting elections inspectors to refuse a ballot based on their 
“visual inspection” and belief that a person was 51% black.262 “What 
the legislature cannot do directly it cannot do by indirection . . . the 
law is partial by imposing unreasonable burdens of proof . . . [it] is 
calculated to impair and defeat the colored man’s right to vote, but 
such seems to be its leading, nay its only object.”263 
Then came the Thirteenth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme 
Court did not see a Thirteenth Amendment case until 1872, and only 
spoke in dicta until 1883.264 But some state courts commented on the 
Amendment in the meantime. Both the California and Indiana courts 
held that the initial Civil Rights Act was constitutional under the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.265 California, removed from 
the fervor of the war, provided some striking reasoning:   
The Thirteenth Amendment was intended to make all men born in the 
United States . . . equal before the law with respect to personal liberty . . . . 
It would be a remarkable anomaly, if the National Government, without 
the Thirteenth Amendment, could confer citizenship on aliens . . . 
irrespective of race of color, and cannot with . . . that amendment confer 
on those of the African race . . . all that the Civil Rights Act seeks to give 
them.”266  
                                                 
 262. Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665, 666-67, 684-92 (1867). The statute 
permitted inspectors to deny someone the right to vote if he had a visible admixture 
of African blood and could not prove his whiteness by affirmative evidence. It also 
allowed black blood to be proven by reputation, but required white blood to be 
shown by direct testimony. Id. 
 263. Monroe, 17 Ohio St. at 666-67, 684-92  (“If the legislature have power 
to abridge suffrage of black men of visible admixture, then they can exercise the 
same power in regard of white men of visible admixture, then they can exercise the 
same power in regard to white men of black hair, of low stature, of small fortune . . . 
. Between the legislative power and the legal elector, . . . the constitutional 
protection stands as a bulwark for the protection of his right to vote.”). 
 264. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  
 265. People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658, 664-72 (Cal. 1869); Smith v. 
Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 300-01, 303-07 (Ind. 1866). 
 266. Washington, 36 Cal. at 664-72. 
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The Rule of Liberty had substantial power in constitutional law 
cases. That power was largely split along ideological lines—It was 
potent in many northern courts and despised by most southern 
judges. But these cases were decided largely after the South began 
deconstructing the Rule of Liberty and replacing it with a rule that 
whites had a natural right to hold African-Americans in slavery.   
D. The Demise of the Rule of Liberty 
With the exception of [a few cases], founded mainly on the unmeaning 
twaddle, in which some human judges and law writers have indulged, as to 
the influence of the “natural law,” “civilization and Christian 
enlightenment,” in amending, proprio vigore, the rigor of the common law 
. . . the cases and text-writers are uniform in declaring that slavery, as it 
exists in this country, was unknown to the common law . . . and hence its 
provisions are inapplicable. . . . Masters and slaves cannot be governed by 
the same common system of laws: so different are their positions, rights, 
and duties. 
Supreme Court of Mississippi, George v. State (1859).267 
Many southern courts reacted to the sectional crisis and the 
Missouri Compromise by annihilating the Rule of Liberty and 
asserting that the law ought to favor the cherished institution of 
slavery.268 Some Southern judges lamented this turn of events, 
noting, “Until fanaticism and folly drove us from that position, the 
law of our State has uniformly favored emancipation . . . with such 
limitations and guards as rendered the free negro, not dangerous but 
as a useful member of the community, however humble he might 
be.”269 This “fanaticism and folly” extended not only to laws 
governing emancipation, but was the origin of the rule that a slave, 
once freed, received only the right to freedom of movement.270 
This shift demanded a new theory. England was no help—
Somerset had been limited, but its core principles were never 
                                                 
 267. George v. State, 37 Miss. 316, 320 (1859).  
 268. TSESIS 80-81; Andrews v. Page, 3 Heiskell 653, 660 (Tenn. 1871) 
(“Before the unconstitutional, and impertinent interference, of intermeddlers in other 
States . . . the uniform course of decision in this State was shaped with a view to 
ameliorate the condition of the slave.”). 
 269. 2 CATTERALL at 267.  
 270. TSESIS 79, 78-95; Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 198-201 (1853) (“[T]he 
status of the African in Georgia, whether bond or free, is such that he has no civil, 
social, or political rights or capacity, whatever, except such as are bestowed upon 
him by statute. The act of manumission confers no other right but . . . [T]o become a 
citizen of the body politic, capable of contracting, of marrying, of voting, requires 
something more than the mere act of enfranchisement.”). 
50 © 2017 Chris Kozak  
overruled. So the Southern Courts inverted the Rule of Liberty. The 
freedom of African-Americans was not a natural law good.271 Neither 
was slavery a necessary evil: It was “the cornerstone of American 
democracy rather than the rock on which it must break.”272  
The Georgia courts were particularly venomous. One judge 
proclaimed that abolitionists were “fighting against the Almighty.”273 
Another asserted that “Christ, recognizing the relation of master and 
servant, ordained [slavery] as an institution of Christianity. It is the 
crowning glory of this age and of this land.”274 Other cases are 
scattered throughout the previous sections of this Article, repudiating 
nearly every other facet of the Rule of Liberty.  
Then came Dred Scott. Chief Justice Taney held that black 
people, slave or free, could never be citizens of the United States:  
[T]he legislation and history of the times, and the language used in the 
Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who 
had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had 
become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor 
intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable 
instrument. . . . They had for more than a century before been regarded as 
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white 
race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had 
no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro 
man might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.275 
Although the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are widely 
understood as overruling Dred Scott,276 Southern states continued to 
treat the theory underlying the decision as binding, namely, that 
slavery was a natural-law good.277  
The Maryland courts therefore held that even after abolition, 
the incidents of slavery remained lawful, because slavery was part of 
                                                 
 271. See, e.g., George v. State, 37 Miss. 316, 320 (1859). 
 272. DYER 99-101; TUSHNET 230-32; Harrell v. Watson, 63 N.C. 454, 458-
60 (N.C. 1869) (complaining that slavery should not be looked at as something 
wicked, but as something established and made lawful by the laws of the state, 
recognized by the Constitution, and handed down from father to son as a tradition).  
 273. Am. Colonization Soc’y v. Gartrell, 23 Ga. 448, 464-65 (1857).  
 274. Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 578-83 (1851).  
 275. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856) 
 276. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 300-01 (1964); Keyes v. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1495 (D. Colo. 1985); State v. 
Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659, 663 (R.I. 2004).  
 277. Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S.C. 283, 284-307 (S.C. 1870) (“For upwards of 
two centuries, slavery existed in South Carolina, owing its origin to now statutory 
provisions . . . it existed as a common law institution . . . although not recognized by 
the common law of England, it lawfully prevailed in her American colonies.”). 
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the natural law.278 Therefore, as “[s]lavery [was] established by the 
municipal law of the State, rights vested under the municipal law . . . 
are not affected by a change or abrogation of th[at] law.”279 Several 
courts continued to enforce limitations on emancipation from the 
pre-war era,280 and voided transfers of property to slaves by citing the 
slave codes.281 South Carolina even said that the 1868 Reconstruction 
Constitution of the state—which voided all contracts based on slave 
property—was unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.282 These contracts, the court said, must be valid 
because they were “consistent with the public opinion which 
prevailed in South Carolina when [they] w[ere] entered into.”283 
The intellectual gymnastics in these cases are astounding. But 
they are part of our history, and the results they wrought remained in 
our law until the Warren Court era.284 Even then, the Court did not 
revive the Rule of Liberty, but instead granted near-unlimited 
deference to the federal government to protect civil rights.285 This 
theory, as applied to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, has 
been peeled back in recent years—and the Roberts Court can be 
trusted to overrule the Thirteenth Amendment version as well.286 But 
the Roberts Court has also leaned heavily on “traditional” canons of 
interpretation,287 and so it should replace Warren-Court deference 
with a principle based on the ancient history of the Rule of Liberty.  
III. RESURRECTING THE RULE OF LIBERTY 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in the 
United States, or anywhere subject to their jurisdiction. 
 
-U.S. Constitution, Amendment Thirteen288 
                                                 
 278. Williams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500, 505-06 (1869).  
 279. Id.  
 280. Rosborough v. Rutland, 2 S.C 378, 380, 386 (S.C. 1870).  
 281. Cobb v. Battle, 34 Ga. 458, 477, 483 (1866); Rosborough, 2 S.C at 380, 
386; McMath v. Johnson, 41 Miss. 439, 459-60 (1867). 
 282. Calhoun, 2 S.C. at 284-307; Blease v. Pratt, 3 S.C. 513, 513 (1872).  
 283. Calhoun, 2 S.C. at 284-307. 
 284. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) 
 285. Id. at 440-41.  
 286. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997); Shelby 
Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2628-29 (2013). 
 287. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT 214, 224-32, 254-59; SCALIA & 
GARNER 8-9. 
288. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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The Southern states, having lost on the battlefield, waged a 
second war in the courtroom, attempting to limit the scope of new 
laws favoring freedom and civil rights.289 This strategy worked, 
yielding decisions like the inaptly named Civil Rights Cases.290 
Couched in the language of “states’ rights” and federalism, the 
Supreme Court slowly adopted 1850-60s southern jurisprudence on 
liberty and slavery.291 
A. The Ghost of Dred Scott 
The U.S. Supreme Court first confronted the Thirteenth 
Amendment in The Slaughter-House Cases.292 Although the case 
involved no question of slavery, the Court discussed basic principles 
of the Amendment.293 First, the Amendment preserved abolition as 
“the main and most valuable result” of the war in the Constitution 
“as one of its fundamental articles.”294 Second, the Amendment 
referred to human servitudes only.295 Third, the prohibition on 
“involuntary servitude” was meant to “forbid all shades and 
conditions” of servitude, since “the purpose of the article might have 
                                                 
289. See Michael A. Ross, The Supreme Court, Reconstruction, and the 
Meaning of the Civil War, 42 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 275, 283-89 (2016) (“In the Crescent 
City, John Archibald Campbell, a former United States Supreme Court Justice who 
had resigned from the Court to join the Confederacy, launched an all-out legal 
campaign designed to thwart Louisiana’s Reconstruction government. While some 
white Southerners turned to violence to fight the new order, a cohort of reactionary 
lawyers turned to briefs rather than bullets in the effort to destroy the biracial 
governments in the South.”).  
 290. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 32 (1883). 
 291. See TSESIS 78-95; Ross, supra note 289, at 291 (“[A]t the turn of the 
twentieth century . . . most white Americans, including historians, came to agree that 
. . . it was also good that Reconstruction (the ‘Tragic Era’) failed and that white 
supremacy was restored. By the end of the 1890s, it was clear that . . . the struggle to 
define the meaning of the civil war had been won . . . by the ideological descendants 
of Andrew Johnson.”).  
 292. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).  
 293. The case involved a challenge to a state-sanctioned monopoly because it 
placed an involuntary servitude on property. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 50-
51. The court dispensed of this issue in a few sentences. See id. at 69 (“To withdraw 
the mind from the contemplation of this grand yet simple declaration of personal 
freedom of all the human race . . . and with a microscopic search endeavor to find in 
it a reference to servitudes, requires an effort, to say the least of it.”). 
 294. Id. at 68. 
 295. Id. at 69.  
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been evaded, if only the word slavery had been used.”296 Fourth, the 
Court proclaimed that the Amendment was not limited to those of 
African descent, as its text “forbids any other kind of slavery, now or 
hereafter.” Finally, the court seemed to adopt the “mischief rule” as a 
means of interpreting the amendment.297  
Congress responded to these grand dicta by passing the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, the first attempt to raise African-Americans to 
equal footing with whites.298 The act, among other things, prohibited 
private racial discrimination.299 The Court, however, threw out 
several convictions under the act, holding that the law was beyond 
Congress’s authority.300 Although the Thirteenth Amendment 
abolished slavery, “decree[d] universal civil and political freedom 
throughout the United States,” and gave Congress authority to punish 
private individuals for imposing the badges and incidents of slavery, 
it held that private discrimination was not an incident of slavery.301   
What, the Court asked, had racial discrimination to do with 
slavery?302 Nothing. “The long history of African slavery in this 
country gave us very distinct notions of what it was, and what were 
its necessary incidents,” and discrimination was not among them.303 
Legally enforced service? Yes. Physical restraint of movement? Yes. 
Incapacity to contract, sue, testify, and hold property? Yes. Imposing 
harsher sentences on slaves than on free persons? Yes.304 But 
Congress had used the Thirteenth Amendment to legislate these 
barriers out of existence,305 and not purported to adjust “the social 
rights of men and races in the community.”306 
The Thirteenth Amendment “has respect, not to distinctions of 
race, or class, or color, but to slavery,” and it “would be running the 
slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of 
                                                 
 296. Id. at 69. 
 297. Id. at 72 (“But what we do say, and what we wish to be understood is, 
that in any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these amendments, it 
is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said was the pervading spirit of 
them all, the evil which they were designed to remedy . . . until that purpose was 
supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can accomplish it.”). 
 298. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 19 (1883). 
 299. Id. at 19-20. 
 300. Id. at 32. 
 301. Id. at 28-29. 
 302. Id. at 29. 
 303. Id. at 29. 
 304. Id. at 29. 
 305. Id. at 29-30 (citing Act of April 9, 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 27).  
 306. Id. at 30. 
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discrimination” based on race.307 In Justice Bradley’s mind, the black 
man’s rights “[we]re to be protected in the ordinary modes in which 
other men’s rights are protected.”308 
By “ordinary modes,” the Court meant state law, which 
ostensibly required all businessmen to open their venues to all 
“unobjectionable” persons.309 Free persons of color prior to abolition, 
the Court insisted, had never demanded that racial discrimination 
was unlawful.310 The Thirteenth Amendment did not change this, as it 
“merely abolished slavery.”311 And that disposed of the case.312  
Under this tangled mess of formalism is the sinister ghost of 
Dred Scott. Although the Court paid lip service to the “universal 
civil and political freedom” guaranteed by the Amendment and said 
that Congress had power to punish privately imposed badges of 
slavery, it instead read both principles out of the Amendment 
entirely. Certainly, Congress could attack the legal disabilities of 
slavery. It could compel the law to treat people of color the same as 
white persons. The only truly private action Congress could reach 
was the physical restraint of one’s liberty under the involuntary-
servitude clause of the Amendment.  
Indeed, until 1968, the only way the Amendment applied to 
private actors was through forced-labor statutes.313 It did not allow 
Congress to protect other “individual rights” of African-Americans 
by prohibiting whites from forcing them to leave their chosen 
professions314 or voiding restrictive covenants.315 Allowing Congress 
to do more would federalize too much authority that belonged to the 
States before the Thirteenth Amendment was passed.316 
                                                 
 307. Id. at 30-31. 
 308. Id. at 31. 
 309. Id. at 31. 
 310. Id. at 31-32. 
 311. Id. at 32. 
 312. Id. at 32; see also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 641-43; 
Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887). 
 313. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905); Pollock v. Williams, 322 
U.S. 4 (1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); United States v. Gaskin, 320 
U.S. 527 (1944); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. 
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
 314. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 9 (1906).  
 315. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926) (holding that the 
Amendment does not protect the individual rights of African-American).  
 316. Hodges, 103 U.S. at 9 (“[I]f, as we have seen, [the Amendment] 
denounces a condition possible for all races and all individuals, then a like wrong 
perpetrated by . . . . any men upon any man on account of his race, would come 
within the jurisdiction of Congress, and that protection of individual rights, which, 
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In short, Congress’s actual power under the Thirteenth 
Amendment looked something like this:  
 
 Slavery Involuntary Servitude 
§ 1 
Nullified laws upholding 
slavery (Civil Rights 
Cases) 
Prohibited the control by 
which personal service is 
coerced for another’s benefit 
(Bailey v. Alabama) 
§ 2  
(state 
action) 
Overturn laws disabling 
African-Americans from 
holding property, suing, 
contracting, etc. (Civil 
Rights Cases) 
Void state laws criminalizing 
default, leaving employment, 
etc. (Bailey v. Alabama) 
§ 2  
(private 
action) 
? 
Punish peonage; forced labor; 
restraints on personal liberty 
(Clyatt v. United States) 
 
Thus, even though the Court held both (1) that slavery and 
involuntary servitude were distinct prohibitions;317 and (2) that 
Congress could punish privately imposed badges of slavery,318 it 
never permitted Congress to exercise that power.  
By constructing this framework, the Court revived the logic of 
Dred Scott: That under the U.S. Constitution, “whether they had 
become free or not,” African-Americans were “so far inferior, that 
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”319 
Such inferiority had nothing to do with slavery; in fact, this personal 
inferiority was why enslaving the African-American was “just” to 
begin with.320 Therefore, the text of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
operating only on slavery, did not reach so far as to change this 
status.321 And “[i]t would be running the slavery argument into the 
ground” to hold that Congress could change it.322 
                                                                                                       
prior to the 13th Amendment, was unquestionably within the jurisdiction solely of 
the states, would be transferred to the nation.”).  
 317. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872); Bailey, 219 U.S. at 
241. 
 318. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 28 (1883). 
 319. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).  
 320. Id.  
 321. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 30-31.  
 322. Id. at 30-31 (1883). 
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This is a clear-statement rule in favor of slavery. It assumes 
that in the absence of clear, positive guarantees in the Constitution, 
African-Americans had no federal rights that the courts could protect 
from private infringement—except the right to freedom of 
movement.323 But this is precisely the rule advocated by the late 
southern courts,324 which held that without intervention from the 
positive law, all the incidents and disabilities of slavery must remain 
undisturbed, even if the institution is abolished.325 Although Congress 
could eliminate the legal incidents of slavery, it refused to say 
whether this stemmed from abolition or equal protection.326 
This is backwards. The abolitionists won both the literal and 
the constitutional war over slavery, and so their perspective on the 
law of slavery and freedom has been constitutionalized.327 It would 
be bizarre if the rationale and assumptions of Chief Justice Taney 
survived the Thirteenth Amendment, even if the holding did not.  
B. The First Constitutional Moment 
The Rule of Liberty demonstrates that the Court was not 
writing on a blank slate when it first interpreted the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Neither was Chief Justice Taney. But Dred Scott was 
not unanimous. Justice John McLean dissented: excoriating the 
majority, not for racism, but for ignoring the Rule of Liberty.  
                                                 
323. The court made this in its discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Ross, supra note 289, at 286 (“The Court, [Justice] Miller wrote, was not willing to 
undo federalism, and radically change the whole theory of the relations of the State 
and federal governments to each other and both these governments to the people . . . 
‘in the absence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of 
doubt.’” (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79-80 (1872)). 
 324. Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 198-201 (1853). 
 325. Cf. Williams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500, 505-06 (1869) (“[N]egro slavery 
and the slave trade were not only recognized as lawful, but sanctioned and protected 
by all of the enlightened and commercial nations of Europe. . . . The cases, 
therefore, in which it has been held that actions based upon statute law, fall with the 
repeal of the law, do not apply. Slavery being established by the municipal law of 
the State, rights vested under the municipal law . . . are not affected by a change or 
abrogation of the law.”) 
 326. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 29-30.  
 327. Ross, supra note 289, at 280-83 (discussing how the Reconstruction 
Amendments were “the North’s terms of capitulation to the defeated South.”). See 
generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1998); Professor Ackerman’s primary 
concern is constitutional change outside the Article V process. However, the idea of 
a “constitutional moment” carries even more weight when “higher lawmaking” in 
national politics is accompanied by a formal amendment. See id. at 6-8. 
 The Rule of Liberty 57 
Justice McLean first recounted the history of the Rule of 
Liberty. Judges in Rome, Europe, and England held that “slavery can 
exist only within the territory where it is established; and that, if a 
slave escapes, or is carried beyond such territories, his master cannot 
reclaim him, unless by virtue of some express stipulation.”328 The 
Court adopted this principle in Prigg v. Pennsylvania with no 
dissent.329 It had also been adopted by the courts in the slave states—
not through amorphous concepts of liberty,330 but on “the law as it is, 
and not as it ought to be.”331 The law, according to these courts, was 
that slavery “exist[ed] by the positive law . . . without foundation in 
the law of nature, or the unwritten and common law.”332  
This history compelled the conclusion that slavery was a state 
institution.333 The Founders were careful “to guard the [Constitution] 
so as not to convey the idea that there could be property in a man,” 
and therefore only created a federal right to recover fugitive slaves.334 
In construing the Constitution, McLean cautioned against relying on 
                                                 
 328. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 534 (McLean, J., 
dissenting) (citing GROTIUS, lib. 2, ch. 15, 5, 1; GROTIUS, lib. 10, ch. 10, 2, 1; 
WICQUEPOSTS AMBASSADOR, lib. 1, p. 418; 4 Martin 385; Case of the Creole in the 
House of Lords, 1842; 1 PHILLIMORE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 316, 335; 2 Barn & 
Cres. 440 (K.B.); Somerset v. Stewart, 1 Lofft 1, 19 (1772)). 
 329. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 534 (McLean, J., dissenting) (“The state of 
slavery is deemed to be a mere municipal regulation, founded upon and limited by 
the range of the territorial laws.”). 
330. Daniella Lapidous, The SCOTUS Marriage Decision, in Haiku 
MCSWEENY’S (June 26, 2015), https://www.mcsweeneys.net/articles/the-scotus-
marriage-decision-in-haiku (“Hark! Love is love and / love is love is love is love. / It 
is so ordered. ”). 
 331. Id. at 534 (quoting Rankin v. Lydia, 2 A.K. Marsh. 467, 270-79 (Ky. 
1820) (“In deciding the question (of slavery), we disclaim the influence of the 
general principles of liberty, which we all admire, and conceive it ought to be 
decided by the law as it is, and not as it ought to be. Slavery is sanctioned by the 
laws of this State, and the right to hold slaves under our municipal regulations is 
unquestionable. But we view this as a right existing by the positive law of a 
municipal character, without foundation in the law of nature, or the unwritten and 
common law.”)). 
 332. Id. at 536. 
 333. Id.  
 334. Id. at 537 (“Our independence was a great epoch in the history of 
freedom; and while I admit the government was not made especially for the colored 
race, yet many of them were citizens of the New England States, and exercised the 
rights of suffrage when the Constitution was adopted . . . . Many states, on the 
adoption of the Constitution, or shortly afterward, took measures to abolish slavery 
within their respective jurisdictions . . . and it was a well-known fact that a belief 
was cherished by the leading men, South as well as North, that the institution of 
slavery would gradually decline, until it would become extinct.”).  
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“a traffic which is now declared to be piracy.”335 If the Court did so, 
“[W]hy confine our view to colored slavery? On the same principles, 
white men were made slaves. All slavery has its origin in power, and 
is against right.”336 
Justice McLean then turned to the heart of the case: Whether 
Scott became free by residing in Illinois. He started again with 
Prigg: The Fugitive Slave Clause was inserted in the Constitution 
because of the Rule of Liberty. Otherwise, every free state could 
slowly destroy slavery by providing an incentive for slaves to run 
away.337 But the deal reached by the Framers only conferred federal 
power on cases where the slave, “held to service or labor in one state, 
under the laws thereof . . . escap[ed]” into another state.338 Thus, if a 
master began living in a free state, he lost the ability to hold a person 
in slavery, because the Fugitive Slave Clause did not apply:  
[I]f slavery be limited to the range of the territorial laws, how can the 
slave be coerced to serve in a State or Territory, not only without the 
authority of law, but against its express provisions? What gives the master 
the right to control the will of his slave? The local law, which exists in 
some form. But where there is no such law, can the master control the will 
of the slave by force? . . . Where no slavery exists, the presumption, 
without regard to color, is in favor of freedom. . . . Where the law does not 
confer this power, it cannot be exercised.339 
Since no federal law could support the slave right—and since no 
state law did support the slave right—Scott became free residing in 
Illinois.340 Under Prigg, this was “not mere argument, but it is the 
end of the law, in regard to the extent of slavery.”341 
Sandford’s only way to win the case, then, was to show that 
Scott became re-enslaved by returning to Missouri. But Justice 
McLean pointed out that the Rule of Liberty forbade this.342 
Moreover, the irrevocability principle was part of state common law 
                                                 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).  
 337. Id. at 547-48.  
 338. Id. at 548-49.  
 339. Id. at 548.  
 340. Id. at 548-49. 
 341. Id. at 549. (emphasis added).  
 342. Id. at 550-58, 560-63 (citing Commonwealth v. Pleasants, 10 Leigh 697 
(S.C.); Betty v. Horton, 5 Leigh 615 (S.C.); Spencer v. Dennis, 8 Gill. 321 (Md.); 
Hunter v. Belcher, 1 Leigh 172 (Va.); Harry v. Decker & Hopkins, 1 Walk. Miss. 36 
(Miss); Rankin v. Lydia, 2 A.K. Marsh. 467 (Ky. 1820).; Griffith v. Fanny, 1 Va. 
Rep. 143 (Va.); Rhodes v. Bell, 2 How. 307).  
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in Illinois and Missouri—something the Court could not change.343 
Neither had Missouri passed legislation re-enslaving Scott.344 And “it 
would be singular if a freeman could be made a slave by the exercise 
of a judicial discretion. And it would be still more extraordinary if 
this could be done, not only in the absence of special legislation, but 
in a state where the common law is in force.”345 
Even if the Rule of Liberty was a mere suspension of the slave 
power while the slave was in a free jurisdiction, The Slave Grace 
required voluntary return to a slave state.346 Scott had been 
kidnapped.347 Thus, under Rule-of-Liberty conflicts principles, Scott 
was free.348 Additionally, it was a fundamental rule of constitutional 
law that states could not strip away rights granted by another state.349 
“If a state may do this, on a question involving the liberty of a human 
being, what protection do the laws afford? So far from this being a 
Missouri question, it is . . . within [federal diversity jurisdiction].”350 
Justice McLean and Chief Justice Taney had fundamentally 
different assumptions about slavery. Taney began with the inferiority 
of the African-American; McLean began with the Rule of Liberty. 
Judges speak of the democratic process as the means to decide on 
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public values.351 But the process spoke: It said Taney was wrong. The 
war and the Thirteenth Amendment cemented one side of this debate 
in the Constitution in a way no other Amendment has. It makes far 
more sense to say that Justice McLean’s dissent—and therefore, the 
Rule of Liberty—ought now to control cases based on the 
Amendment that overruled the majority opinion.  
C. Liberty After Abolition 
Perhaps the most significant objection to the Rule of Liberty is 
that slavery no longer exists. The Rule of Liberty was, after all, 
invented to limit the evils of slavery and to hedge against wrongful 
enslavement.352 Since neither justification has any force in the 
modern world, a reasonable objection could be made that there is no 
place for the Rule in the modern legal system.  
This argument makes two fatal errors. First, it ignores the fact 
that historically, American courts used the Rule of Liberty for 
suppletion, not just amelioration. This principle goes all the way 
back to Blackstone, who acknowledged that “in the extension of 
natural right and justice, the Judge may safely go beyond even that 
which was in the minds of those who framed the law.”353  
Second, it is founded on an interpretation of the Amendment 
that the Court has always rejected. It assumes that the Amendment 
only abolished slavery, nothing more. But even while imposing a 
restrictive gloss on the Amendment, the Court has always asserted 
that the Amendment reached beyond slavery itself to the badges and 
incidents of slavery.354 Indeed, to read the Amendment any other way 
would bow to the segregationists who thought that the Amendment 
merely nullified state laws establishing or upholding slavery.355 
While the precise scope of this power is properly debatable, the court 
has never asserted that it did not exist.356 
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Congress added § 2 for a reason.357 It is naïve to think that upon 
ratification, all the various disabilities, disadvantages, and racial 
animi associated with slavery vanished. Indeed, history illustrates 
that the opposite is true: Jim Crow, segregation, peonage, 
discrimination, and lynching are only a few examples of the 
traditional “badges and incidents” of slavery.358 
Declaring what these incidents are need not be left to 
Congress’s imagination, and the courts need not abdicate all judicial 
review. The incidents are well-documented, and a court can examine 
them through historical inquiry.359 To fully “enforce” the abolition of 
slavery, Congress must have power to describe and punish these 
historical incidents. Otherwise, the ghost of Dred Scott can legally 
haunt those who are supposed to be completely free. 
IV. THE MODERN RULE OF LIBERTY 
We value the Rule of Lenity because it is as old as our law 
itself.360 But for most of Western history, the Rule of Liberty enjoyed 
the same status. In many states where slavery was vital to the 
economy, courts allowed the principle to control—or at least 
inform—their decisions. Since the Rule of Liberty was so well-
established in emancipation cases, a constitutional abolition of 
slavery should be girded with an equally powerful maxim. 
Finding a substantive canon in the Thirteenth Amendment is 
not outlandish. Most major substantive canons have no textual basis 
at all. Lenity comes from history and perhaps the due process 
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clause.361 The avoidance canon was invented to protect the court’s 
institutional capital or to enforce constitutional norms without saying 
so.362 And the federalism canons are rooted more in common-law 
sovereign immunity than in the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments.363 In 
fact, the Court has forcefully asserted that there are principles of 
interpretation that—because of our common-law history—are rooted 
in the text and structure of the Constitution.364  
This tradition provides a framework for understanding the 
modern Rule of Liberty. It is a default rule,365 enshrined in the text 
and structure of the Thirteenth Amendment. Like sovereign 
immunity, there is a tsunami of state jurisprudence recognizing it as 
integral to the common law.366 And although contrary authority does 
exist, it would mock history to say we ought to interpret the words of 
the abolitionist with the default rules of the slaveholder.  
But what would this default rule look like? In the modern 
world, the Rule of Liberty manifests itself through three principles. 
Those principles are (1) The Broad-Construction Principle; (2) The 
Non-interference Principle; and (3) The Implied-Repeal Principle.  
A. The Broad-Construction Principle 
The most straightforward application of the Rule of Liberty 
was that every instrument conferring liberty should be construed 
liberally, in favor of freedom.367 The courts sometimes departed from 
this rule because of the private-law version of the whole-act rule or 
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because of countervailing state policy.368 But the Thirteenth 
Amendment is an unequivocal declaration of freedom, and there is 
no subsequent constitutional text that dilutes its effect.  
Therefore, when interpreting both sections of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the courts should operate under a clear-statement rule 
in favor of liberty. In other words, to render the Amendment 
inapplicable to a case, the opposing party must show by clear and 
convincing historical evidence that the Amendment should not apply. 
The proper application of this principle will bring more coherence to 
interpretations of both § 1 and § 2 of the Amendment.  
1. Resetting § 1 
The common law presumed that freedom from domination was 
the natural order of things.369 At various times in Western history, the 
positive law restricted freedom. These restrictions included the slave 
disabilities, such as the lack of any rights to make contracts, to sue, 
to hold property, to vote, and many others.370 However, the courts, 
constrained by the Rule of Liberty, were loath to apply these laws to 
things not envisioned by the legislature.371  
This history illuminates the Court’s initial misunderstanding of 
the Amendment. The Court treated § 1 as if it simply forbade a 
certain form of human domination. In reality, it did much more than 
that. The Amendment certainly overturned the legal regime that 
allowed people to be held as property. But by barring any positive 
slavery-related restrictions on human freedom, it—by itself—
restored to the African-American the fundamental rights of the 
common law, withheld from the slave only because of slavery. In 
other words, the civil rights of slaves were suppressed only by the 
democratic power of the legislature. But once that power was 
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shattered by the Constitution, no valid legislation remained to 
suppress a former slave’s civil rights.372 
Thus, Congress did not need to pass legislation in 1866 
securing African-Americans the civil rights to sue, testify, hold 
property, make contracts, and to be treated equally before the law. 
Those rights automatically vested in the African-American when the 
Amendment was ratified, and are cognizable in a § 1983 action even 
without legislation. These are the “reflex” rights of the Amendment 
that the Court alluded to in its early dicta.373  
Modern courts have lost sight of these rights in recent years, 
holding that Thirteenth-Amendment rights may only be asserted by 
statute.374 This is only partially true. Some Thirteenth-Amendment 
wrongs are only redressable if Congress says so. But in addition to 
the pure right to be free from chattel slavery or involuntary servitude, 
reflex rights are protected by § 1 regardless of legislation enforcing 
them or not. By historical accident, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments overlap on this point.375 But it is important to recognize 
these reflex rights, because Congress cannot create new rights with 
its enforcement powers; rather, it can only enforce existing rights.376  
The Broad-Construction Principle therefore adds two things to 
§ 1 cases. First, it acts as a hedge against political hostility towards 
civil rights.377 But the inherent rights conferred by § 1 are not 
                                                 
372. The structure of the Amendment itself is sufficient to make this point. 
But there is also substantial evidence that this was the intent the Reconstruction 
Congresses. See Ross, supra note 289, at 279-82, 285-86; Michael A. Lawrence, 
Second Amendment Incorporation Through the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or 
Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 MO. L. REV. 1; MICHAEL A. LAWRENCE, 
RADICALS IN THEIR OWN TIME (2010). 
 373. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 28 (1883). 
 374. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226-27 (1971); Alma 
Soc’y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1236-38 (2d Cir. 1979); Sumpter v. Harper, 
683 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir. 1982); NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1564 (11th Cir. 
1990); But see Foster v. MCI Tcomm’ns Corp., 773 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that the right to be free from racial discrimination in employment is a 
substantive right guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment); Vann v. Kempthorne, 
534 F.3d 741, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that a Tribe’s act of denying a group of 
Native Americans the right to vote would violate the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 375. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 29. 
 376. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
 377. E.g., Manny Fernandez & Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Drops a Key 
Objection to a Texas Voter ID Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/us/justice-dept-will-drop-a-key-objection-to-
a-texas-voter-id-law.html?_r=0 
 The Rule of Liberty 65 
remedial378 in the sense that they require congressional action—they 
are self-executing,379 and the courts do not injure separation of 
powers by enforcing them. Neither are they subject to majoritarian 
will: they are personal, constitutional rights guaranteed by § 1.  
The rights protected by this framework are any rights withheld 
from a group of people because of slavery. This is mostly a historical 
question. But since history can be fuzzy, the Rule of Liberty’s 
default principles require courts to be cautious when holding that 
rights are not guaranteed by § 1. To avoid liability for an injury to a 
group of people in a § 1 case, the government must show by clear 
and convincing evidence that the disability was historically imposed 
without regard for the slave status.  
This standard avoids the polarizing rational-basis/strict-scrutiny 
paradox. Plaintiffs cannot invoke the judicial sledgehammer of strict 
scrutiny by conjuring hypotheticals where a harm could be related to 
slavery.380 But neither can defendants prevail by identifying a 
reason—any reason—that a harm has no relationship to slavery.381 A 
plaintiff should prevail if any historical authority exists showing that 
the harm was connected to the slave status. In cases of historical 
doubt, the court should resolve the issue in favor of liberty.382 
Second, the Rule widens the group of rights which Congress 
can enforce if it chooses to do so. The Court has indicated that 
Congress can only enforce existing rights.383 But the Broad-
Construction Rule requires that this foundation be robust, not 
narrow. Any rights cognizable under the § 1 test described above are 
a legitimate basis for Congressional enforcement legislation. The § 2 
question is how far Congress may go to enforce these rights. 
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2. Enforcing Civil Rights 
The Amendment invests Congress with authority to “enforce 
this Article by appropriate legislation.”384 The Court’s most recent 
interpretation of § 2 is half a century old, from the Warren-Court 
era.385 The case involved a question nearly identical to that in The 
Civil Rights Cases, except the Court reached the opposite result.386 
Congress, the Court said, must be able to “rationally . . . determine 
what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to 
translate that determination into effective legislation.”387 Prohibiting 
racial discrimination in housing cases was not an irrational response 
to race-based slavery; therefore, the statute was constitutional.388 
The reign of rational-basis as the yardstick of Congress’s 
Reconstruction authority is over.389 Although Jones is still good law, 
it is the last relic of its era. The Court has taken a narrow view of 
some cases obliquely touching the Amendment’s substance; and 
while those cases have not reached the core of the Amendment, they 
can be easily extended to reach a formalist result.390  
The Rule of Liberty provides a more solid basis for preserving 
the scope, if not the reasoning, of Jones. The Broad-Construction 
Principle, antebellum federalism principles, and federal courts’ 
treatment of fugitive-slave rights all point in this direction. The same 
sort of default clear-statement rule applies here to Congress’s 
authority: The person challenging a statute must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the legislation targets conduct that has no 
relationship to slavery as it existed in the United States. 
Blackstone provides a helpful place to start. Civil-rights 
statutes are often coercive, forcing individuals to do things they 
would rather not. This might seem sufficient to warrant strict 
construction under the Rule of Lenity. But Blackstone acknowledged 
that statutes against frauds, although usually categorized as remedial, 
had consequences that were penal—they voided a contract in which 
the loser may not be at fault.391 However, Blackstone still insisted 
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that these statutes be construed broadly: they act upon the offense, 
not the offender, to void certain things as contrary to law. Thus, in 
seeking to root out offenses—as opposed to the offenders—“the 
judge may safely go beyond the things in the mind of those who 
framed the law.”392 
This aligns nicely with Congress’s reasons for including § 2 in 
the Amendment. The drafters predicted, correctly, that some state 
judges and southern citizens would refuse to recognize the reflex 
rights granted by Section 1.393 Section 2 therefore gave Congress 
power to overturn the disabilities of slavery, and it clothed Congress 
with authority to punish white citizens who maintained that African-
Americans were inferior to them. This kind of power is the minimum 
necessary if the Amendment abrogated Dred Scott entirely. 
The Court has raised two objections to this result. First, that the 
Amendment has nothing to do with race;394 and second, that such 
broad authority impinges on the police powers of the States to 
protect “individual rights.”395 It is true that the Amendment does not 
mention slavery396 But even a modicum of context shows that 
American slavery was emphatically racial, at least in the years just 
before the war—and certainly in the mind of Chief Justice Taney.397  
The Federalism rationale is equally unavailing. The Thirteenth 
Amendment shifted a massive amount of power from the states to the 
federal government.398 Slavery was a state institution, protected by 
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federal agreements—guarantees that had been construed broadly 
against the North.399 The Southern states believed that the Fugitive 
Slave Clause was designed to safeguard their right to hold slaves, 
because history taught them that the right could not “be safely left to 
the control of local tribunals.”400 The Fugitive Slave Acts received 
the same broad construction from the federal courts.401 The framers 
of the Thirteenth Amendment acted against this looming context and 
the Rule of Liberty. The constitutional replacement of the federal 
power to protect the slave right should therefore be construed 
broadly against the states and their citizens.402  
The Broad-Construction Principle therefore adds two things to 
§ 2 jurisprudence. First, when Congress acts to protect the inherent 
rights guaranteed by the Amendment, it stands on both § 1 and § 2. 
Section 1 provides a floor of judicial protection that Congress cannot 
reduce. Section 2 allows Congress to enforce this protection by 
tailoring remedies to specific social problems.403 In these cases, the § 
1 clear-statement rule should apply. 
Second, Congress can exercise its § 2 power to go beyond 
protection, and into enforcement. These cases largely consist of acts 
to punish private racial animi, for example, in housing,404 businesses 
and public forums,405 employment,406 and physical violence.407 These 
                                                 
 399. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 U.S. (Pet.) 539, 611-12 (1842). 
 400. See Ex parte Hill, 38 Ala. 429, 436-37, 450, 456 (1863) (Opinion of 
Walker, C.J.) 
 401. Fugitive Slave Law Cases, 30 Fed. Cas. 1007, 1009 (C.C. N.Y. 1851); 
Prigg, 16 U.S. at 611-12.  
 402. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Epilogue: The Enduring Legacy of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, in TSESIS at 304–11. See also generally Robert J. 
Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Lessons 
From Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187 (2005). 
 403. Cf. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 616, 620 (“Congress, then, may call [its 
enforcement power] into activity, for the very purpose of giving effect to that 
right.”). 
 404. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440-41 (1968); 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 3604-06  
 405. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 
 406. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e2(a). Although this section of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 was based squarely on the Interstate Commerce Clause, the logic of Jones 
would have also justified it under the Thirteenth Amendment. See Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (July 2, 1964). Private racial 
discrimination in housing and in employment are on similar legal planes; Congress’s 
authority should apply to each equally. See Jones, 392 U.S. 409, 440-44.  
 407. United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Hatch, 722 F.3d 492 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Maybee, 687 F.3d 1026 (8th 
Cir. 2012); 18 U.S.C. § 249. 
 The Rule of Liberty 69 
are “badges and incidents” of slavery in the sense that the slave 
codes permitted whites and masters to use these tools to reinforce 
their status as better than the “degraded” African-American.408 This 
private animus was the keystone of slavery in the United States.409 
Though state law no longer supports this conduct, states are not 
obligated to prohibit it.  
Congress, therefore, must have power to deal with these 
problems through legislation. States may justifiably provide varying 
levels of civil-rights protection to their citizens as part of their 
function as “laboratories of democracy.” But underneath those 
protections is the federal right not to have blackness be a negative 
factor in a person’s private life. This right cannot vary from state to 
state. Congress, therefore, can use § 2 to punish private conduct that 
a master or a white person could legally commit under the slave 
codes.410 These statutes ought to be constitutional unless the person 
challenging the law shows that no state permitted a white person to 
commit the conduct proscribed by the statute.  
Properly construed, then, Congress’s power under the 
Thirteenth Amendment should look something like this:  
 
 Slavery Involuntary Servitude 
§ 1 
Nullified laws upholding 
slavery; conferred civil and 
personal rights on African-
Americans  
Prohibited the control by 
which personal service is 
coerced for another’s benefit  
§ 2  
(state 
action) 
Provide remedies and 
procedures for violations of 
§ 1 rights  
Void laws criminalizing 
default, provide remedies;  
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however, that is an issue for another time. Cf. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 36, 72 (“If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop 
slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may 
safely be trusted to make it void.”).   
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§ 2  
(private 
action) 
Prohibit private race-based 
discrimination; punish hate 
crimes 
Punish peonage; forced labor; 
restraints on personal liberty  
 
These § 2 rights are “dependent, as to their mode of execution, 
solely on the act of Congress.”411 Thus, in these cases, a court cannot 
establish a remedy itself as it might under § 1, even if Congress 
could legally do so. However, in cases involving the scope of these 
laws, the Broad-Construction Principle requires courts to presume 
that Congress meant for the statutes to sweep broadly. In deciding 
these cases, the traditional tools of statutory interpretation become 
helpful, with one notable exception. The Thirteenth Amendment 
shifted power over an entire area of the law from the states to the 
national government, and it limited the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments in the process. Thus, arguments based on the various 
federalism canons cannot be used to blunt the scope of these statutes 
or mandate textual clarity. Congress is justified in assuming that 
when it exercises its § 2 authority, it need not speak with surgical 
precision on a federalism question that was settled by the Civil War. 
3. Construing Free-Labor Statutes 
I have written elsewhere about the constitutionality of free-
labor statutes—laws enacted to protect the right to be free from 
involuntary servitude, such as prohibitions on peonage and forced 
labor.412 These statutes are almost exclusively penal, and so the 
question arises whether the Rule of Liberty has any application in 
these cases. Applying the canon in Lenity–Liberty disputes seems 
slightly quixotic: If the canons are opposites, then applying them 
both in the same case should yield a net zero result.413 But the canons 
are not opposites—they are inverse applications of the same 
                                                 
 411. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 U.S. (Pet.) 539, 620 (1842) (analyzing the 
fugitive slave clause). 
 412. See Chris Kozak, Orginalism, Human Trafficking, and The Thirteenth 
Amendment, XI S.J. POL’Y & JUST. (forthcoming 2017); see also United States v. 
McClellan, 127 F. 971, 976 (S.D. Ga. 1904) (“It does not seem to me that [peonage] 
is a question upon which the courts of the country should be astute to discover 
reasons to nullify an act of congress made in favorem libertatis.”).  
 413. See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and 
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 
401-06 (1950).  
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principle, and thus may align or diverge depending on the 
interpretive problem. 
Lenity has more relevance in malum prohibitum crimes (things 
unlawful just because we say they are) than over malum in se crimes 
(things inherently wrong).414 This is one way where the courts can—
and have—set cases apart. In United States v. McClellan, an early 
peonage prosecution, the defendants argued that the means-of-
coercion element of the statute was ambiguous, and therefore could 
not apply to them.415 The Southern District of Georgia, in a striking 
move, held that the Rule of Lenity only applied when the defendant 
was morally “free from injury or wrong.”416 It would not, by 
construction, permit defendants to avoid punishment when they were 
so obviously trying to recreate slavery.417  
This makes intuitive sense. If slavery is, as the Romans 
thought, one of the most grievous violations of the natural law,418 
crying foul because you were not quite evil enough is disingenuous. 
Lenity, therefore, is inappropriate, and the courts should reject these 
arguments when raised by defendants who quibble about the means-
of-coercion element of the offense. Unless the facts charged are so 
clearly outside the statute that no reasonable person could think he 
was committing a moral wrong, the courts should uphold the 
indictment. The fair-notice justifications for Lenity in these cases are 
nonexistent—every person in the United States should be aware that 
forced labor and slavery are unconstitutional in the same way that 
censorship, self-incrimination, and state religion are unconstitutional. 
                                                 
 414. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 57, at 367-68; OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881).  
 415. United States v. McClellan, 127 F. 971, 976-77 (S.D. Ga. 1904). 
 416. Id. 
 417. Id. (“But how can it be contended that the conduct of the prisoners, as 
described in this indictment, as innocent or free from injury or wrong? Is it not 
inimical to the amendment of the Constitution which defines involuntary servitude? 
Is it not involuntary servitude to seize by force, to hurry the victim from wife and 
children, to incarcerate him in a stockade, and work him in range of the deadly 
muzzle of the shotgun, or under the terror of the lash, and continue this servitude as 
long as resentment may prompt, or greed demand . . . and for their own selfish 
purposes consign them to a life of involuntary servitude, compared to which the 
slavery of the antebellum days was a paradise.”) 
 418. ALLAIN 9-16, 21 (quoting Dominicus Tuschus, Practicarum 
conclusionum juris, Lit. S, concl. 227, no. 1 (Rome 1651) (“Just as it is lawful to 
take any means to evade death, so also it is lawful to avoid slavery.”)); Servitus, 
ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW (1953). 
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This is the answer, as well, to the argument that the Rule of 
Lenity is based on nondelegation, not fair notice.419 The 
constitutional prohibitions on slavery and involuntary servitude are 
self-executing against the individual, and in this way, they are unlike 
any other part of the Constitution.420 Thus, free-labor statutes do not 
just flow from Congress’s democratic decision to punish—the 
condemnation also flows from the Constitution itself. Nondelegation 
is therefore less salient here, since the courts have inherent power to 
interpret the Constitution. 
However, the traditional, non-slavery aspects of Lenity should 
remain intact, even in these cases. Intent is one example: Courts were 
(and are) unwilling to dispense with a traditional mens rea in 
criminal cases, in the absence of clear legislative intent.421 There is 
no reason to abandon this common-law rule in free-labor cases 
unless Congress clearly imposes a lower standard. 
B. The Noninterference Principle 
The Rule of Liberty also precluded judicial interference when 
political actors granted freedom. The Noninterference Principle 
required near-absolute deference in these situations, because the 
court’s equity powers could not extend to void the right to freedom, 
except in the clearest of cases.422 Democratic power can legitimately 
be used to grant freedom or to restrict it. However, under the Rule of 
Liberty, judicial power cannot not be used against raw political 
power that favors liberty.   
The Thirteenth Amendment did not repeal Article I’s 
delegation of legislative powers to Congress, nor did it divest the 
courts of their Article III authority to say what the law means. 
However, in a world where the executive has discretion to enforce 
the law, the Rule of Liberty has special force when the executive 
interprets the law to favor liberty. The Rule of Lenity—in its due-
                                                 
 419. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 57, at 369; Dan Kahan, 
Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345. 
420 See Ahkil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403, 403 
(1997).  
 421. Birney v. Ohio, 8 Ohio 230, 238 (1837); Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 
1619, 1630-31 (2016). 
 422. See, e.g., Findly v. Nancy, 3 T.B. Mon. 400, 400-02 (Ky. 1826) (“It 
may be a matter of some consideration . . . whether the chancellor ought, in any 
case, to grant a new trial at law, for the purpose of taking away a right to freedom . . 
. . The case which would warrant such interference ought to be strong and clear.”). 
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process and separation-of-powers form—appears here in the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion.423 Liberty has its own role. 
One of these cases recently ended in a tie before the Supreme 
Court. United States v. Texas involved the President’s authority to 
interpret the Immigration and Nationality Act to allow certain 
undocumented immigrants to work.424 Texas’s primary argument was 
that the statute conferred no such authority on the Executive.425 In an 
ordinary statutory-interpretation case, Texas might be right. 
However, the free use of labor has long been recognized as a 
component of liberty protected by the Thirteenth Amendment.426 
Allowing the President to give someone the right to remain here 
(which the President may do) but not the right to work here creates a 
caste of residents who are economically paralyzed in a condition 
similar to slavery or the Jim Crow South.427  
The Rule of Liberty has something to say about this deadlock. 
Executive interpretations ordinarily receive deference so long as the 
statute is ambiguous and the result is reasonable.428 The Rule of 
Liberty suggests that if the executive interprets an ambiguous law to 
favor liberty, the courts should defer to it—reasonable or not—
unless and until the political branches act. This is what courts do 
when prosecutors decline to file charges.429 These decisions are 
afforded near-absolute deference because the courts will not compel 
the executive to prosecute someone at the behest of a third party.430  
                                                 
 423. See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See 
generaly Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at its Zenith: The 
Power to Protect Liberty, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
 424. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146-48 (5th Cir. 2015), affirmed 
by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 425. Id. at 149-50.  
 426. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 16-20 (1944); Clyatt v. 
United States, 197 U.S. 207, 218 (1905). 
 427. Oral Argument, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, at 28:8-10, 20-22, 
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 428. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
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 430. See id. (citing, e.g., Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973); Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1970); Newman v. 
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Similarly, when the executive attempts to “alleviate human 
suffering” and does not violate vested rights in the process, the 
courts should not interfere. Unreasonableness, arbitrariness, or 
caprice in executive action is inappropriate when the result violates 
vested rights.431 But when the executive bends ambiguous rules to 
alleviate burdens on human liberty, that unreasonableness inflicts no 
harm aside from offending the political convictions of the party not 
in the White House. Take Texas as an example: Congress may 
restrict the employment liberty of illegal immigrants, but it should do 
so clearly—not by implication, inference, or judicial interpretation.432 
If the executive violates the political opinions of the country, 
Congress or an election can remedy it. The courts do not exist to 
weigh in on political disputes about immigration policy; they exist to 
protect individual rights.433 And permitting someone to work violates 
no one’s vested rights.434 
C. The Implied Repeal Principle 
It is commonly accepted that the Thirteenth Amendment 
repealed the Three-Fifths Clause and the Fugitive-Slave Clause of 
the original Constitution.435 But the Rule of Liberty often persuaded 
courts to hold that slave-law statutes were impliedly repealed by 
laws only slightly inconsistent with slavery.436 It is possible, then, 
that the Thirteenth Amendment limited other portions of the original 
                                                 
 431. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). 
 432. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146-48, 180-86 (5th Cir. 
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 433. See Marbury, 5 U.S at 166. 
 434. Another way to frame this argument is as a nonjusticiable political 
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 435. See, e.g., Evenwell v. Abbot, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1146-47 (2016) (Alito, J., 
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Constitution insofar as they supported slavery. Hate Speech is a good 
candidate for this thought experiment. 
The Supreme Court has generally been intolerant towards hate-
speech laws.437 There are good reasons for this, sounding in 
democratic legitimacy and fear of censorship.438 But there are also 
good reasons to believe that the Thirteenth Amendment diluted 
protection toward some race-based hate speech, and that Congress 
has power to punish it as an incident of slavery. 
The First Amendment has never shielded all expression. 
Threats, defamation, and obscenity are beyond the pale of 
protection.439 They are not protected, generally, because they harm 
while adding nothing meaningful to public dialogue.440 But in 
antebellum South Carolina, calling a free person a “negro” or a 
“mulatto” was actionable defamation. The courts refused to protect 
this speech because if true, it would subject the person to the 
disabilities in the slave codes. In other words, they removed it from 
the ambit of protected speech because it was harmful to its victims.441  
The parallel between these cases and modern hate-speech laws 
is not perfect. Calling someone a n____r has no effect on their legal 
status. But these cases still have some force. Race-based hate speech 
has no purpose other than to harm, to intimidate, to invoke the dual-
caste system of slavery, and to reinforce the perceived inferiority of 
the black person. 
Thus, there is room in First Amendment jurisprudence for 
another historical exception: Speech that has no serious literary, 
scientific, or historical value but that is solely intended to degrade 
the African-American is not protected.442 But this is the extent of 
Liberty’s reach. When deciding cases on the margin of the “serious 
                                                 
 437. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  
 438. Compare generally James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, 
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literary, scientific, or historical value” test, the courts should err in 
favor of Lenity. If the criminal avenue is too severe, this theory 
could still be used to sustain a federal tort statute on the same topic.  
This exception could be seen as an impermissible authorization 
for Congress to regulate all hate speech—or even all race-based hate 
speech. This assumes too much. It is true that the bright history of 
the West is riddled with discrimination and prejudice against women 
and minority groups.443 It is true that the Amendment protects all 
people from slavery. But African-American slavery is the original 
sin of the United States; it is the most vile thing we have done to 
other humans.444 No other group of people in American history have 
been subjected to the vicious and evil degradation that African-
Americans have experienced. “Difficult and intractable problems 
often require powerful remedies,”445 and if any problem in our 
history can be considered intractable, it is slavery and the racial 
hatred of blacks that slavery nurtured in the heart of the white 
American. A prohibition on hate speech against the African-
American rests squarely on this footing; other bars on hate speech do 
not. The First Amendment cannot protect speech that is inextricably 
intertwined with an institution that the Constitution destroyed.  
CONCLUSION 
“All slavery has its origin in power, and is against right.”446 
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